By Matteo Trevisan and Konrad Bleyer-Simon, Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, European University Institute

From 6 to 9 June 2024, European citizens will decide on the future of the European Union, as they are voting for their representatives in the European Parliament for the next five years. Across the member states, parties and candidates are campaigning in a moment of unprecedented political and social challenges¹, which will make the next electoral round an extraordinary testbed for European democracy. 

In such a political momentum, the rules and practices related to the media coverage of candidates and the dissemination of political advertising play a vital role in ensuring that people are sufficiently informed on their electoral choices. At the same time, this can pose significant risks to the fairness of elections, especially when considering the manipulative potential of online political advertising, as exemplified, among others, by the Cambridge Analytica scandal. This post is built on the insights of the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) 2024 implementation – based on 2023 data – and specifically on the forthcoming results of the indicator Audiovisual media, online platforms, and elections, to show how risks related to political campaigns in the media are mitigated in EU member states, and to identify the areas where caution is needed. 

Bias in audiovisual media

The media coverage of parties and candidates takes place usually in news and public affairs shows, as well as in dedicated debates between candidates ahead of the elections. As the risks of political bias and preferential treatment might increase during periods of electoral campaigning, legal and other provisions across member states are generally put in place to ensure, especially for these periods, that candidates and parties have access to media, and that they are treated equally. Often, the reporting is monitored by media regulators, which exhort the media to provide fair representation of political actors and political viewpoints. 

One of the sub indicators of the MPM – PSM bias, specifically assesses the public service media’s coverage of political parties. The low risk result in this context (25%) indicates that concerns over the existence and implementation of a regulatory and self-regulatory framework for the access and fair representation of different political actors and viewpoints in public service media (PSM) are limited at the EU level, with only three countries assessed as high-risk, based on data from the year 2023 (Greece, Hungary, and Malta). 

Yet, the analysis detects several factors that can deem regulatory safeguards, as well as their monitoring and application, ineffective. The most obvious of these factors is interference by dominant political actors. In cases where leading political parties have a strong grip on national PSM, it is likely this would result in distorted coverage of political events and unbalanced airtime, in spite of existing regulatory safeguards. This is the case of Hungary, where the PSM is considered extremely biased towards the governing party and in past years opposition candidates were only provided minimal shares of airtime during the campaign (Bleyer-Simon et al., 2024); or Poland, where there was reported high partisanship towards the former ruling party in the audiovisual coverage of the 2023 electoral campaign on TVP (Klimkiewicz, 2024). In Slovakia, similar concerns appear to have diminished after the 2022 appointment of the new Director General, with no systemic elements of risk detected in the context of the September 2023 early parliamentary election (Urbaníková, 2024).² 

In this context, the effects of political interference can also manifest in a more indirect manner. For example, in Greece, the worrying dearth of data in relation to the elections of 21 May and 25 June 2023 is ascribed to the lack of resources of the media regulator for the monitoring activity. According to the MPM’s country researchers, this can in turn be also attributed to a willful political choice (Papadopoulou & Angelou, 2024). Also in Spain, while there is no reported evidence this might depend on political considerations, no studies are provided on the matter, save from those of the Catalan regulatory authority (Suau Martinez et al., 2024). 

Compared to PSM, the analysis in the private audiovisual media sphere detected more concerns. The sub indicator Commercial audiovisual bias scores 33% percent in the EU countries, which is just below the threshold for medium risk. This result partly depends on the fact that less requirements on balanced coverage (and the monitoring thereof) are found for commercial audiovisual media. As already identified in the MPM 2023 report, regulation on this matter may be regarded as being overly impacting on the editorial autonomy of commercial media. Still, self-regulatory safeguards have the potential to strengthen media quality standards (Bleyer-Simon et al., 2023). 

The analysis at the European level shows that, across the member states, coverage and monitoring in terms of representation of political stances in the commercial sphere is considered and addressed in different manners. The Luxembourg Independent Audiovisual Authority (ALIA) doesn’t monitor the coverage of commercial radio and television channels,  – moreover, the country team sees it as particularly problematic that neither does it in the case of municipal channels (Kies & Lukasik, 2024) – this term refers to media outlets that are neither private, nor public service media, and are usually financed by municipalities. In Estonia, private broadcasters are not obliged to give political parties airtime. However, if they decide to do so, they need to follow section 14 (Political balance during active election campaigning) of the Media Services Act which says that parties should be given equal opportunity to speak during election campaigns (Palmer & Žuffova, 2024). In Finland, not even self-regulatory codes deal with the representation of political parties in private media – contrary to the PSM Yle (Ylikoski & Ala-Fossi, 2024).  

Compared to the PSM, MPM’s country teams detected a more pronounced degree of unfairness in the media representation of political contestants. Austria notably jumped to the high-risk band this year. As reported by Seethlaer and Beaufort (2024), there was a lack of studies on the role of commercial broadcasters during the 2023 “super election year”, even though Servus TV, the TV station with the largest reach (4.3%), was perceived to somehow propose a distorted coverage. In this context, one has also to mention that political parties can boycott media that they dislike, thereby hampering their coverage (as was the case in Estonia, see Palmer & Žuffova, 2024). On a more positive note, despite many signs of media capture under the former government, private channels in Poland were able to provide a diverse and pluralistic coverage of the 2023 electoral campaign, although the tone differed among channels (Klimkiewicz, 2024).  

As to the online dimension of fair representation, clear standards are still widely lacking. The Italian case can be taken as an example, in such a context. In 2023, the national media regulator, the Authority for the Guarantees in Communications (AGCOM) sent a report to the Government  for the reconsideration of the measures on political communication and access to information means (law n. 28/00 – the so-called “par condicio”), pointing to the evolution of the technological and social context and the asymmetry between traditional operators and online ones (Vigevani et al., 2024).³

Political advertising 

In the MPM, political advertising refers to paid-for messages that advocate for a certain political party or candidate running for election (or the topic of a referendum) – the production, placement and/or amplification of these ads is usually paid for by the parties or candidates, but supporters or interested parties might also be behind them.⁴ In a broader sense, any paid-for, or amplified message that has an impact on the outcome of an election can be considered (such as issue-based advertising, that indirectly supports candidates, by advocating for a stance on potentially controversial topics).⁵  

The risks associated with data-based techniques of persuasion, such as micro-targeting and other data-driven methods used to deliver politically tailored messages, have started to be taken into account by the Media Pluralism Monitor in conjunction with the 2019 round of the European elections, which saw almost half of the EU population counting on online news as their principal informative source (European Commission, 2020). 

Within the indicator Audiovisual media, online platforms and elections, the MPM2024 report sees the main sources of risk in the sub indicator Rules on political advertising online, which scores a medium risk at 56% for the EU27. In comparison, the risk related to the sub-indicator Rules on political advertising in the audiovisual media (PSM and commercial players) is significantly lower (11%).

Political advertising on PSM raises rather limited concerns. This largely reflects the general availability of rather strict regulations. In many European countries, political advertising is not allowed by national law. This is to prevent wealthier candidates and political groups from obtaining a larger amount of advertising space, and/or to avoid the exclusion of actors with fewer budgetary means. In cases where it is allowed, regulatory safeguards ensure that parties can campaign under the same conditions, and that audiences are not misled by concealed political advertising.⁶ 

On commercial audiovisual players, the risks are modest as well. In most countries, buying advertising space is available to all contending parties, on equal conditions and rates of payment, and the rules make sure that political advertising is adequately labelled, so that audiences are aware that the content they see is political advertising. Furthermore, political parties and candidates need to be transparent about their spending on advertising and the placement of their ads – usually the amount spent by politicians and parties is limited by electoral codes. Still, issues were recorded. As illustrated in the case of Slovenia, where advertising rates are equal, but still too high for certain smaller parties to afford (Milosavljević & Biljak-Gerjevič). Moreover, opaque discounts to certain parties can be made, as detected in Estonia (Palmer & Žuffova, 2024). Not least, issue-based advertising or certain forms of state advertising can be also utilised to campaign in favour of the governing party, as happens in Hungary (Bleyer-Simon, et al., 2024). 

Contrarily, political advertising in the online environment, and especially social media poses significant risks to the fairness of election campaigns. As anticipated, the sub indicator Rules on political advertising online scored the highest risk value under the Audiovisual media, online platforms and elections indicator (56%, upper medium-risk), with only four countries in the low-risk band. The rest of the countries are equally distributed between the medium and high-risk bands. The results indicate that the online sphere is largely unregulated, both in terms of providing equal opportunities for contestants, and transparency of political advertising, with relevant consequences in terms of public accountability. In some countries, traditional regulation extends to online media as well. However, such laws prove largely outdated and, most of the time, they do not address online platforms. 

To a large extent because there are no targeted regulatory safeguards, social media activities of parties are assessed as highly opaque across member states, in their expenditure and on the techniques used for campaigning (i.e. micro-targeting; transformation of common interests pages into political ad accounts right before elections; use of non-official pages connected to political parties). In France, for example, the country team reported that Emmanuel Macron’s 2022 presidential campaign relied on data brokers to target profiles on Facebook (Ouakrat & Sklower, 2024). Transparency International (as cited in  Štetka et al., 2024), informed that online expenditures and activities of a large part of candidates in the Czech 2023 Presidential Election were opaque. Until now, the lack of data related to parties’ activities online detected across Europe, has been only partly compensated by information provided in the ad libraries of major online platforms, which permit a rough tracking and quantification of the online ad expenditure.

In line with the Commission guidance on the application of GDPR in the electoral context, data protection authorities (DPA) are expected to monitor the use of personal data on individuals by political parties for electoral campaigning purposes, and even use their sanctioning powers in cases when such data is misused. However, the results show that DPAs are often unable to live up to the task, either due to a lack of sufficient funding or possible political control. In the case of ten countries, the country teams saw the work of authorities clearly as inadequate.⁷

Conclusion

The MPM identifies political advertising online as a most concerning issue for a healthy electoral process. A general lack of targeted regulation, opacity from political actors, as well as the partial ability of Data Protection Authorities to address the use of personal data on individuals, are persistent factors that might challenge the quality of the next European electoral round.  

Against the risks related to the employment of data-based techniques of persuasion and manipulation, several important steps have been undertaken at the supranational level, from the Code of Practice on Disinformation (in which one of the pillars focuses on political and issue-based advertising) to the recent adoption of the Regulation on the Targeting and Transparency of Political Advertising, in March 2024. This will limit targeting options for political ads, and will require that they are published with a transparency label that allows the identification of political ads and provides information on what election they are related to, who paid for them and how much, and the possible targeting criteria applied. While this recent legal novelty represents a significant step forward against misuse of micro-targeting and other data-driven techniques used to deliver tailored messages, it will apply only in 2025 – save for the measures on the non-discriminatory provision of cross-border political advertising, which will be already applicable.

At the same time, other tools can be implemented in the next European electoral cycle. In March 2024, the European Commission published guidelines under the DSA, recommending measures to Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines to mitigate systemic risks online that may impact the integrity of elections, including for political advertising. Moreover, in December 2023, the Commission already published a Recommendation (2023/2829 – on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament) with specific requests for the actors involved. While non-binding, these instruments could  certainly help in mitigating the risks to the integrity of the European elections.

The MPM results also showed that bias might emerge from the representation of political actors and viewpoints in the audiovisual media sphere, and especially from the commercial one, where regulation is less prevalent. Finally, in many cases across Europe available safeguards proved outdated, and ineffective, against the risks of new technological and communication scenarios.

References

AGCOM (2023). Segnalazione al Governo del 28 luglio 2023. https://www.aeranticorallo.it/wpcontent/uploads/2023/07/Segnalazione-al-Governo-28-07-2023.pdf

Bleyer-Simon, K., Polyák, G., & Urbán, Á. (2024). Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Member States and in Candidate Countries in 2023. Country report: Hungary. Florence, Italy. To be published in June 2024.

Bleyer-Simon, K., Brogi, E., Carlini, R., Da Costa Leite Borges, D., Nenadic, I., Palmer, M., Parcu, P. L., Trevisan, M., Verza, S., & Mária Žuffová, M. (2023). Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era : application of the media pluralism monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the year 2022. https://doi.org/10.2870/087286Brogi, E., Carlini, R. M., Nenadic, I., Parcu, P. L., & de Azevedo Cunha, M. (2020). Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era: application of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2020 in the European Union, Albania & Turkey: Policy report. European University Institute, DOI: https://doi. org/10.2870/21728.

EBU (2024, March 13). Slovak government proposals threaten media independence. EBU. https://www.ebu.ch/news/2024/03/slovak-government-proposals-threaten-media-independence

European Commission, (2020, June 19). Commission reports on 2019 European elections: fostering European debates and securing free and fair elections. Press release. European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1123 

Kies, R., & Lukasik, S. (2023). Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Member States and in Candidate Countries in 2022. Country report: Luxembourg. Florence, Italy. To be published in June 2024.

Kolozsi, Á. (2024, 4 May). Szabályt sértett a köztévé, amikor a Fidesz politikai reklámját adta le híradós riportnak álcázva. 444.hu. https://444.hu/2024/05/04/a-nemzeti-valasztasi-bizottsag-szerint-is-a-fidesz-politikai-reklamjat-adta-le-a-kozteve-hirados-riportnak-alcazva

Klimkiewicz, B. (2024). Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Member States and in Candidate Countries in 2023. Country report: Poland. Florence, Italy. To be published in June 2024.

Milosavljević, M., & Biljak-Gerjevič, R. (2024). Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Member States and in Candidate Countries in 2023. Country report: Slovenia. Florence, Italy. To be published in June 2024.

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Štetka, V., Sybera, A., Adamcíková, J. (2024). Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Member States and in Candidate Countries in 2023. Country report: The Czech Republic. Florence, Italy. To be published in June 2024.

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1. Since the latest electoral round in 2019, the European Union has been subjected to unprecedented challenges, from the pandemic outbreak to the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. Most recently, one has to add the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which further fuelled polarisation of political instances as well as raised questions on “the connection between European policy and European proclaimed values”. Not least, state-backed foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) has emerged as a particularly prominent threat. ↩︎
2. However, in early 2024, there were widespread fears about increased political control over the PSM (see EBU, 2024), and the 15 May 2024 assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico may contribute to further polarisation of the political discourse, in Slovakia and beyond. Certain Slovak politicians reportedly blamed the media for radicalising the attacker (Molina Acosta, 2024), and in the follow-up, the country’s ruling coalition submitted amendments to the Law on Freedom of Access to Information, which would put additional burden on independent journalists (Nicholson, 2024). ↩︎
3. While not specifically related to the online dimension of the “par condicio”, one has to mention the debate that emerged in May 2024 over the confrontation between the prime minister Giorgia Meloni and the secretary of the Democratic Party (PD) Elly Schlein, that was initially foreseen in RAI’s channels in light of the European elections. After requesting the opinion from AGCOM  – which had made the possibility of confrontation conditional to the consent of the majority of the lists with representation in parliament – RAI cancelled the confrontation, since that majority was not reached. See: https://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/34208634/Comunicato+stampa+15-05-2024/f6130ac9-dcbe-439e-b4b1-62479437c7d2?version=1.0  and https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2024/05/rai-salta-il-confronto-meloni-schlein-non-ce-la-maggioranza-chiesta-dallagcom-dd77040c-2e89-4c0f-82bd-82aebc66f08b.html ↩︎
4. According to the definition used for the MPM, political advertising is defined as content that appears in paid-for space offered by media or online platforms throughout the year advocating directly or indirectly, for or against, a party, a candidate or position in election, referenda, popular votes, legislative bill or any other policy issue (issue-based advertising). The definition of political advertising derives from the Council of Europe’s relevant recommendation, and issue-based political advertising is considered in line with relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, which reasoned that “expressions reflecting controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in general and also lying at the heart of various political debates could be considered as `political`”. ↩︎
5.  State advertising is a different concept, and is only considered in cases in which it is used for campaigning purposes (as a form of issue-based ad). ↩︎
6. However, there may be cases in which the rules are only formally followed. In Hungary, for example, the PSM is officially not allowed to air political advertising, but, after the conclusion of our data collection,  during the 2024 campaign (for the EP and for municipal elections, which take place on the same day, on 9 June), the PSM incorporated advertisements by the prime minister or politicians of the governing party (which were in most cases published initially as Facebook videos) as segments in its news programmes. The National Election Office found that the practice is against the law (Kolozsi, 2024), still, the PSM went on with the practice (Tóth-Szenesi, 2024). ↩︎
7. Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. ↩︎