Dr. Dariia Opryshko, Philipp-Schwartz Fellow, University of Münster
The need for action
Transparency of media ownership is a significant factor in fostering trust in the media and ensuring fair economic competition. In a public consultation on the impact assessment to accompany EMFA, conducted in the European Union (EU) in 2022, it was identified by public authorities and citizens as the most important area of action in the light of an EU initiative on the European Media Freedom Act (hereinafter – EMFA). According to the public consultation, 81% of all respondents identified enhancing transparency of media ownership as the preferred EU-level action, 94% – that it was important to have access to information on who owns or controls media companies, while 81% claimed that this data was currently only available to a limited extent or not at all and 80% of all respondents were in favour of the introduction of EU obligations to all media companies in the EU to disclose their ownership structure, including beneficial owners (Ares(2022)5718935, 2022: 3,4).
The regulation of issues related to media ownership transparency is quite fragmented across the EU (Borges D., Christophorou C., 2024: 71). The adoption of the EMFA was a step towards the introduction of harmonised rules on media ownership transparency, but the approach introduced is still very general and soft. This can be explained by the fact that transparency requirements shall be balanced with rights such as respect for private life and protection of personal data (Borges D., Christophorou C., 2024: 66).
In this blog post, I would like to continue the discussion started by Danielle Borges on the challenges and opportunities offered by Article 6 of the EMFA, and I propose to look at this question from a perspective of countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (hereinafter – FIMI). For this purpose, the approach to transparency rules should be strengthened, and if it is done responsibly, it can be a way to protect the information space from foreign information manipulation and interference. And the Ukrainian experience can serve as an example to illustrate this.
Ukraine and media ownership transparency: from combating oligarchic influence to countering FIMI
In 2015, Ukraine introduced media ownership transparency requirements aimed at reducing the influence of oligarchs on the information space (Opryshko D., 2023: 13). Media outlets in television and radio broadcasting were required to disclose information that would identify all individuals with significant direct or indirect participation in a legal entity or those with the ability to exert significant or decisive influence on its management or activities. This included control relationships within the ownership chain. Additionally, media outlets were required to list the ultimate beneficial owner on their official websites and submit this information annually to the National Council. The law mandated that this information be publicly accessible.
In 2022, the Law of Ukraine “On Media” strengthened these requirements, inter alia, by broadening the definition of “media.” Upon its enactment, the law applied ownership transparency requirements to all types of media: audiovisual media, print media, online media, audiovisual service providers, video-sharing platform providers, and electronic communication service providers for broadcasting purposes using the radio frequency spectrum (Opryshko D., 2024a: 10-11). Furthermore, the Law introduced specific provisions regarding media ownership transparency during times of armed aggression and post-conflict period (Opryshko D., 2024b: 254-257).
The latter was done to counter informational aggression of the Russian Federation and to reduce the influence of Russian disinformation and manipulation of Ukrainian citizens. According to the Law “On Media”, while the provisions of the Chapter IX of the Law are in force, media in Ukraine are forbidden to have any connections with the aggressor state neither via ownership, nor via financing (para. 1 of Art. 120).
If the mentioned connection exists, such subjects are refused by the National Council to be registered as media or to participate in the competition for obtaining a license. If the requirements of the Law regarding ownership and financing are violated, the National Council may decide to refuse to extend the validity of the license, to file a lawsuit to cancel the license or cancel the registration. The relevant decision of the National Council leads to the termination of the activity of such media. However, if the media brings its ownership structure and financing mechanisms into compliance with the legislation of Ukraine and provides the regulator with relevant information, the National Council may review its decision.
Several cases illustrate the application of these provisions. One prominent example involves the Viasat group, which owns multiple television channels (Opryshko D., 2024b: 254-256, 259-261). An investigation into its ownership revealed connections with the aggressor state, specifically to JSC “National Media Group” and Alina Kabaeva, both sanctioned by Ukraine and the EU for actively spreading propaganda and disinformation related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2476: point 156; Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878: point 1171). As a result, these channels were banned from retransmission in Ukraine.
Following the enactment of the Law “On Media,” Ukraine’s informational space became fully open to European media. Shortly after, Viasat channels that registered in Estonia attempted to resume broadcasting in Ukraine, but providers were advised against including them in service packages due to their temporary registration (issued for three months) with limited territorial coverage (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). As of February 2025, Viju – a brand of “Viasat Global” LLC, encompassing channels such as Viasat History, Viasat Explore, Viasat Nature, and Viasat Sport – remains on Ukraine’s List of audiovisual media services on-demand and services of audiovisual service providers of the aggressor state (hereinafter – the List). Its retransmission is prohibited on the territory of Ukraine due to its ownership ties to Russia, and that it is directed at the territory and audience of Russia (Decision of the National Council of Ukraine № 1297 of 2023).
Another example is the inclusion of service IVI (ИВИ) to the List mentioned. It was included on the same grounds – non-compliance with the provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On Media” regarding ownership structure and because it was targeting Russian territory and audience. In this case, the Ukrainian company MEGOGO formally requested the National Council to investigate IVI, providing evidence of its violations, which prompted the National Council to conduct its own investigation into the matter (Minutes No. 18: 10). This underscores the importance of public access to ownership information, as regulatory bodies often lack the resources to monitor media providers proactively. Civil society and the private sector thus can play a crucial role in identifying potential connections with the source of FIMI.
What to do with online media and channels on online platforms?
With online information sources growing in influence year by year, should such web resources disclose their ownership structure? In Ukraine online media are obliged to submit information on their ownership structure and its changes to the National Council only at the request of the regulator. Interestingly, in recent years, there has been a positive trend toward voluntary self-disclosure of information about beneficiaries, directors, and editorial boards of online media. Research by the NGO “Institute of Mass Information” shows that in 2024, transparency among Ukraine’s leading online media increased by 12% compared to 2023, reaching 80% (up from 68% in 2023) (Institute of Mass Information, 2024). This shift is primarily driven by media outlets striving to earn the audience’s trust—and, consequently, their attention.
A more complex situation has developed in the realm of online platforms. Notably, the Ukrainian legislator has established different legal frameworks for online platforms beyond Ukrainian jurisdiction (such as YouTube, Netflix, META, X, and Telegram, to name a few) and for users or accounts on these platforms that have registered as online media under Ukrainian legislation. In the former case, online platforms are not required to disclose their ownership structure to the National Council, whereas in the latter, they must comply with the relevant provisions of the Law “On Media.” However, certain regulatory “grey zones” remain, particularly regarding oversight of the ownership structure of accounts and channels created on foreign online platforms outside the Ukrainian jurisdiction that, in fact, function as online media in Ukraine without being officially registered. Some of these accounts and channels attract large audiences and actively spread disinformation and manipulative content.
One example is the Telegram channel “Trukha,” which by the end of 2022 had an audience of three million people. Journalists discovered that it was linked to over 60 other Telegram channels, which together form an information network (Rodak Kateryna, 2023a; Sklyarevs’ka Gala, 2023). Their total audience amounted to 12 million people, roughly a third of Ukraine’s population. Journalistic investigations revealed that “Trukha” was presumably used to spread disinformation and manipulative content, including in support of certain politicians (Rodak Kateryna, 2023a; Sklyarevs’ka Gala, 2023). The low quality of the channel’s content is corroborated by various research and ratings, which classify it as one of the leading sources of disinformation (Filter. National Media Literacy Project, 2022; Rodak Kateryna, 2023b; Dukach Yulia, 2022).
Journalists also reported that the channel’s managers receive hundreds of thousands of dollars via crypto wallets. This payment method was likely chosen because of the anonymity of crypto wallets, making it almost impossible to trace the ultimate owner(s). In addition, journalists argued that the channel’s true owner is not Maksym Lavrynenko, who officially claimed ownership (Rodak Kateryna, 2023a).
The problem lies in the fact that there are currently no legal mechanisms in Ukrainian legislation to access information about the true beneficiary of a channel created on an online platform. In fact, this is not only related to the poor communication with Telegram’s representatives. The deeper problem is that the Ukrainian market is too small to impose conditions on BigTech companies. While efforts are being made to strike a balance between freedom of expression and national security interests, FIMI and disinformation continue to erode the information space and deepen societal divisions.
After the journalistic investigation was published, “Trukha” was officially registered as a legal entity and Maksym Lavrynenko was named as its owner and beneficiary. However, questions remain about the channel’s funding and connections (Sklyarevs’ka Gala, 2024).
Channels and accounts on online platforms, especially anonymous ones, are a very convenient way to disseminate disinformation, manipulative information and propaganda. They are often used as a part of FIMI (EEAS, 2024: 6, 10-11). The case of “Trukha” shows that such sources of information can reach an audience of millions and potentially have a strong influence on shaping opinions. In the light of these concerns, regulators should be able to require disclosure of the ownership structure of such information channels. This would provide an additional mechanism for countering FIMI.
Conclusions
Article 6 of the EMFA sets out an approach aimed at harmonising media ownership transparency rules across the EU. This is very important as knowledge of the real beneficiaries of the media influences the level of trust in this source of information and contributes to the awareness of possible manipulation (for example, in view of the existence of possible political or financial interests of the beneficiaries of the media).
At the same time, transparency of media ownership can serve as a tool to counter FIMI. Considering the doubts that have been raised about the legitimacy of applying sanction mechanisms to the media sphere (Voorhoof, D., 2022), the introduction of oversight over the ownership structure and financing of the media may become an alternative legal tool to counter FIMI. This is because, if applied responsibly and in a targeted manner, this mechanism does not threaten the right to freedom of expression. On the contrary, it protects this right from being abused.
The Ukrainian experience can be valuable for the EU in this regard. It can serve as a starting point for discussions on strengthening the requirements of Article 6 of the EMFA and developing legal remedies aimed at protecting information space across the European Union by ensuring transparency of media ownership and financing.
Literature
Ares(2022)5718935 (2022) Factual summary report of the public consultation on the impact assessment to accompany an EU initiative on the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13206-Safeguarding-media-freedom-in-the-EU-new-rules/public-consultation_en
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