In Croatia, more than 40% of the population lives in rural areas, most of whom are older than 65. The most common local media is (commercial) radio. There are 140 local FM radio stations out of which 16 cover rural areas in Northern, Pannonian, and Adriatic Croatia (all in Dalmatia) but none of them are located in rural areas.^[1] Several local internet radio stations are located in rural areas. Twenty regional commercial radio stations cover rural, urban, and suburban areas in the same areas and Zagreb County. However, local and regional radio stations broadcast mostly music (65% local and 70% regional).^[2]

There were 9 registered local print outlets in rural areas in 2019.^[3]  Three regional daily newspapers cover rural, suburban, and urban areas and one national daily (Večernji list) publishes local/regional news.

All local and regional radio stations covering suburban areas are commercial and none of them are located in suburban areas. Suburban regions are addressed mostly by regional radio stations and somewhat by local or regional print, combined print, and online or only online media outlets. Therefore, there are no specific suburban print, combined, or online media outlets addressing suburban audiences. Most of the local suburban radio stations are located in Zagreb. According to a 2017 study, around 33% of all Croatian online publications address local audiences (cities or municipalities), 15% for regional audiences and 1% Croatian diasporas and international regional audiences.^[4]

Urban audiences in Croatia have access to the most diverse media infrastructure: local print media, local commercial radio stations, combined print and online media, and online media outlets. The great number of local and regional media is located in Zagreb and the towns in Zagreb County. Local urban media are diverse in terms of the number of media outlets and types of media, yet there are indications that they lack diversity in content.^[5] Most of the local online media copies information from the official web pages of local authorities.^[6] One national daily newspaper (Večernji list) has 10 regional newsrooms in all regions. Croatian PSM (HRT – Croatian Radiotelevision) has 9 regional centres, most of them in Adriatic Croatia. There are also 14 PSM correspondents from 12 Croatian cities and 2 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main national news agency, HINA, registered 9 full-time correspondents in 6 counties and in the largest cities.^[7] In smaller cities, HINA’s network consists of around 40-50 correspondents on some kind of temporary contract and around 100 full-time journalists, photo reporters, editors, and other employees within the newsroom.^[8] The data show a constant decrease in the number of employed local media journalists from 2008 to 2018.^[9] 

^[1] Croatian Chamber of Economy, Register of Print Media, 2019; AEM, Register of Electronic Media, 2023; and Skender, Medijske pustinje, 2023.

^[2] Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Radio i televizija u 2022, 2023,  https://podaci.dzs.hr/2023/hr/58157

^[3] Croatian Chamber of Economy, Register of Print Media, 2019. Although these data should be public and updated, they are not easily accessible. The authors of this chapter asked for it to the Croatian Chamber of Economy and received data for 2019 for print media.

^[4] P. Bilić, I. Balabanić, J. Primorac, K. Jurlin and R. Eterović, Analiza tržišta elektroničkih publikacija, 2017, Institut za razvoj i međunarodne odnose. No more recent study on the topic is available.

^[5]  I. Toma, Portali u Hrvatskoj: sredstvo za informiranje ili manipuliranje? Association for the Protection of Journalists’ Authorship Rights, 2023, https://dznap.hr/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Istrazivanje-o-portalima_Ivanka-Toma.pdf ; H. Šimičević, Kesica presica, Portal Novosti, 2023, https://www.portalnovosti.com/kesica-presica;

^[6] Toma, Portali u Hrvatskoj.

^[7] HINA, Izvješće o radu Upravnog vijeća HINE, 2019

^[8] HINA, Izvješće o radu Upravnog vijeća HINE, 2020

^[9] M. Gregurević, Odumiranje lokalnih medija, Faktograf.hr, 2021, https://faktograf.hr/2021/07/30/odumiranje-lokalnih-medija-doprinosi-sirenju-dezinformacija/

In 2022 the media sector showed a general increase in revenues from commercial advertising in the TV and online media sectors, and a decrease in print and radio.^[1] A decrease in advertising revenues makes local radio stations especially vulnerable due to a fragmented market. An increase in internet advertising revenues is sustainable only for the few biggest publishers. Most of the print media faced a decrease in income from subscriptions in 2021.^[2]

There is no published data on state financial support to media but several studies show that local media depend on local state financial support, which is not transparent and is often used as a tool of political pressure on media.^[3] Local authorities continuously subsidise certain privileged media, even not local but national media.^[4] Municipal media funding and State Treasury media funding in local media for 2020 and 2021 show a significant decrease.^[5] Support from the Fund for Media Pluralism for local televisions and radio varies but it decreased in the last two years. Print media is supported through tax reduction.^[6]

Community (or non-profit) media can apply for the financial support of the Fund for Media Pluralism, support from the Ministry of Culture and Media (public calls), and the support of EU Funds. The non-profit minority media are financed from the state funds for minorities.^[7] If we broaden the definition of community media to local media aimed at specific local communities, there are some indications of an increase in revenues^[8] in radio sectors before the COVID-19 pandemic. Analyses of local media financial models^[9] show that the existing model is unsustainable due to changes in the regulatory environment.

Three media companies dominate the local/regional print market. The first two have 40–60% market shares in circulation. The concentration on the online local media market is smaller but with the same media companies present online. The radio market is relatively regionally fragmented and out of 103 private local radio stations, 32 were owned by 8 people.^[10] Though all electronic media should send data about ownership structure, the real owners (those with influence) are unknown.

The distribution of print media faced a decrease in the physical points of sale and sales.^[11]  Most of the radio and TV stations have web pages with selective online streaming. IPTV and internet services are provided by 3 telecom companies^[12] with a growing number of employees.^[13] Around 37% of households have access only to public terrestrial TV, 32% of households are IPTV users, 10% are cable TV users, and 9% are SAT TV users. Internet penetration in Croatia is 86%, lower than the EU average (93%).^[14] The gap between cities and rural areas in household internet access is around 10%.^[15] In rural areas in Croatia, only 47% of households have access to fast broadband.^[16] Less than 50% of citizens have contact with local TV, print, and online media while radio is the most popular local media.^[17] Pay TV share is higher in Croatia than the EU average.^[18] Pay TV revenues grew 3,8% and on-demand consumer revenues grew 33,6%. At the same time, only 8% of digital news audiences are willing to pay for online news.^[19]

^[1] The Ministry of Culture and Media, Croatian Media Sector Analysis, 2022.

^[2]  Croatian Competition Agency, Print Market Research Report, 2022.

^[3] S. Paparella, O. Ivković Novokmnet andM. Skender,  Državno financiranje bez jasnih kriterija- alat za cenzuriranje medija?, Gong, 2022, https://gong.hr/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Drzavno-financiranje-bez-jasnih-kriterija-Alat-za-cenzuriranje-medija.pdf; M. Skender, Analiza financiranja lokalnih medija javnim novcem, 2022, https://www.hnd.hr/uploads/files/0Analiza%20financiranja%20lokalnih%20medija%20javnim%20novcem.pdf

^[4] M. Skender, State Treasury Media Funding, 2022, https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/melisa7395/viz/Statetreasurymediafunding20202021/Dashboard3  and M. Skender, Municipalities Media Funding, 2022, https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/melisa7395/viz/Municipalitiesmediafunding/Dashboard1

^[5] Skender, Municipalities Media Funding.

^[6] The lowest VAT, 5% is for daily newspapers with the statute of media (Act on the Tax on Added Value).

^[7] Article 15 of the Constitutional Law on Minorities Rights (OG 155/02).

^[8] S. Paparella, Radio postaje – unosan biznis koji je privukao i moćne tajkune, 2019, https://hnd.hr/radio-postaje-unosan-biznis-koji-je-privukao-i-mocne-tajkune

^[9] Skender, Analiza financiranja lokalnih medija javnim novcem.

^[10] N. Mirković and D. Žagar, Pluralizam i vlasništvo medija u Hrvatskoj – slučaj tržišta lokalnih radija, GONG, 2013, https://www.gong.hr/media/uploads/20140212_analiza_uska_grla_lokalnih_radija_u_hrvatskoj_finalno.pdf

^[11] Croatian Competition Agency, Print Market Research Report, 2022

^[12] Croatian Regulatory Authority for Network Industries, Testiranje kvalitete mreže (Net Check), 2023.

^[13] Lj. Božić, Sektorske analize: Telekomunikcije, 2023.

^[14] Eurostat, Digital Economy and Society, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/digital-economy-and-society

^[15] Eurostat, Digital Economy and Society.

^[16] Croatian Regulatory Authority for Network Industries, Three-monthly report for the first trimester of 2023, 2023,. https://www.hakom.hr/UserDocsImages/2022/e_trziste/Tromjese%C4%8Dni%20usporedni%20podatci%20za%20tr%C5%BEi%C5%A1te%20elektroni%C4%8Dkih%20komunikacija%20RHQ12022.pdf?vel=440635

^[17] I. Burić, I. Desović, P. Ivišić and A. Šalinović, Analysis of the Social Impact of the Fund for the Promotion of Pluralism and Diversity of Electronic Media, AEM, 2018, https://www.aem.hr/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/AEM_Studija-utjecaja-Fonda-2013.-2015..pdf

^[18] European Audiovisual Observatory Yearbook, 2022

^[19] Z. Peruško, Digital News Report for Croatia, 2023, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/croatia

The safety of journalists is the highest risk for local journalism, with the very high risk posed by the working conditions of freelance journalists and SLAPP cases. Although full-time employed journalists are relatively well protected under the Labour Act, a large share of journalists are not employed full time, and are thus far less protected (e.g. with unregulated parental or sick leave, and no unemployment benefits). The Labour Act and the Media Act are often not respected when it comes to journalistic work, and self-regulatory measures by the media are also weak.^[1] The wages in the sector are very low and even lower in local journalism. Available data show that the wage among local journalists is between 500 to 700 euro for journalists and between 700 to 900 euro for editors.^[2] One survey demonstrated that almost two-thirds of freelancers in media receive below the average net monthly wage.^[3] For comparison, since January 2023, the minimum wage has been set to 560 euro, and the average net monthly wage in January 2023 was 1,094 euro.^[4] The working conditions of journalists are also poorly protected by collective agreements, and only two media companies have collective agreements that are regularly renewed, both of which are public service media.^[5]

Most of the reported attacks on journalists are in the form of verbal attacks and threats, but there have also been cases of physical assaults on journalists over the last five years.^[6] The nature of the attacks on journalists has been changing, with fewer physical attacks, but more threats directed toward journalists.^[7] Online threats are very common, but rarely reported.

According to the data from the Croatian Journalists Association, there were 945 active lawsuits against media and journalists on damage to reputation and honour in 2023.^[8] Lawsuits are especially dangerous for the local media because they threaten their economic viability and bring great financial and psychological toll on local journalists, who usually live close to people who filed the lawsuit against them. The Ministry of Media and Culture announced it is developing a National Plan for Media and Culture Development from 2023 to 2027, in which one of the measures is protecting journalists from SLAPP lawsuits.^[9] However, these measures still need to be set up and only when implemented the results of these policies will be visible.

Professional associations are active and vocal in promoting ethical standards in the profession. However, they are less effective in ensuring professional standards on the local level because of the shrinking number of local newsrooms, and an inadequately regulated media system. Self-regulatory measures are also weak in ensuring editorial independence.

^[1] Safe journalists, Western Balkans Journalists’ Safety Index, Narrative Report [Croatia], 2021,  https://safejournalists.net/safejournalists-index-zagreb/.

^[2] Safe journalists, Western Balkans Journalists’ Safety Index.

^[3] D. Vozab, Status of atypical workers and freelancers in Croatian media, Trade Union of Croatian Journalists, 2022, http://www.snh.hr/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Media-Freelancers-Report-on-working-conditions.pdf 

^[4] Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Data on average wages, 2023, https://dzs.gov.hr/vijesti/prosjecna-mjesecna-neto-placa-za-sijecanj-2023-iznosila-je-1-094-eura/148

^[5]  Maja Sever, President of the Trade Union of Croatian Journalists and the European Journalist’s Federation, June 2023, phone interview.

^[6] European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Mapping Media Freedom, https://mappingmediafreedom.org/#/.

^[7] Melisa Skender, the Chief Secretary of the Croatian Journalist’s Association, June 2023, online interview.

^[8] Croatian Journalists’ Association, Istraživanje HND-a: broj tužbi protiv novinara i medija ne jenjava, aktivno najmanje 945 tužbi, 2023, https://www.hnd.hr/istrazivanje-hnd-a-broj-tuzbi-protiv-novinara-i-medija-ne-jenjava-aktivno-najmanje-945-tuzbi

^[9] Croatian Journalist’s Association, Panel- SLAPP, oružje za cenzuru: cilj je da ne bude niti jedne SLAPP tužbe, 2023, https://www.hnd.hr/panel-slapp-oruzje-za-cenzuru-cilj-je-da-ne-bude-niti-jedne-slapp-tuzbe

This is the indicator with the second highest risk score (69%), with great risks coming from political influence on local media, through measures such as state advertising.

Regional and local administrative units are sometimes the only owners, or a part of the ownership structure, of regional and local media. There are instances of indirect political control over local media with owners having close ties to political parties.^[1]

There are many cases of the unfair and non-transparent allocation of subsidies and state advertising on the local level, which allows for strong political interference in local media autonomy. Local and regional media receive subsidies from the European funding programmes and the Fund for Media Pluralism operated by the regulatory agency in a rather transparent manner. However, regional and local administrative units also subsidise regional and local media from their budget, which is often criticised as non-transparent, without clear criteria, and with the decision on fund allocation often being made discretionary by the head of the local government. The analysis found that contracts between some regional and local governments and media after the public calls for subsidies specify that the media are obliged to report and promote the activities of local governments to receive a subsidy.^[2] For example, a local television channel made contracts with local governments offering “production, filming, and broadcasting of specialised interviews” in their news and current affairs programmes.^[3]  Therefore, local budget subsidies are often a way of covert state advertising.

State institutions and state-owned entities are obligated to allocate 15% of their annual budget for the promotion of their activities in regional and local media.^[4] The legal framework does not define criteria and procedures to ensure transparency and fairness in state advertising, and research suggests that state advertising is mostly done in a non-transparent manner and used for political influence.^[5] There are many examples of state-owned enterprises, ministries, and other state institutions making contracts either with media outlets or PR agencies, which serve as intermediaries in distributing promotional content in media.^[6] Many promotional articles are not clearly labelled as such, which is a violation of the Media Act. These practices threaten local journalism, which is being replaced by local government PR.

Research demonstrates that journalists recognise strong commercial pressures,^[7] and that pressure towards sensationalism and profit-making has increased over time.^[8] When asked to rank sources of influence on journalistic work in a survey, journalists ranked advertisers in second place.^[9] Although the Media Act and the Electronic Media Act^[10] regulate advertising in media—advertising in media should be clearly stated, should not be misleading, and hidden advertising is forbidden—some analyses of local media found that promotional content was not always labelled as such, thus breaching this legislation.^[11] Regulatory and self-regulatory safeguards prove ineffective against political influence over editorial content, with systematic cases of influence.

The regulatory agency (AEM) has a remit over all local television channels, radio stations, and digital media, but not over local print media, nor does it have its local branches. Although there was a case of a controversial decision on the license allocation to a local radio station in 2021, there was no clear evidence that it was caused by political or economic influence.^[12]

Because management boards of public media are usually appointed in parliament, the political majority currently in charge has great political influence over public service media, and therefore also on the local branches. However, this is different from the private local media outlets, which are usually also funded by local governments and are dependent on them financially. The local branches of public service media do not depend on local governments financially, but political influence is present at the national level, which has repercussions on the local level as well.^[13] Overall, local media content can be assessed as just partially diverse.

^[1] There were cases of local television stations whose owners had ties to political parties. For example, people and companies in the ownership structure of the local television Z1 were reported to be connected with the party Domovinski pokret, see S. Paparella, Godinu dana nakon kupnje, misteriozni vlasnik već prodaje Z1, Zagrebi.hr, 2022, https://zagrebi.hr/godinu-dana-nakon-kupnje-misteriozni-vlasnik-vec-prodaje-z1/. Osječka televizija wes bought by a owner connected to the party HDZ in a famous corruption case in 2010- although the ownership changed in the meantime, there is still a possibility of political control, see H. Šimičević,  Gradonačelnika ima tko da snima, Portal Novosti, 2022, https://www.portalnovosti.com/gradonacelnika-ima-tko-da-snima.

^[2] Skender, Analiza financiranja lokalnih medija javnim novcem.

^[3] Šimičević, Gradonačelnika ima tko da snima.

^[4] Article 38 of the Electronic Media Act (OG 111/21).

^[5] Paparella, Ivković Novokmet, Skender,  Državno financiranje bez jasnih kriterija.

^[6] Paparella, Ivković Novokmet, Skender,  Državno financiranje bez jasnih kriterija.

^[7] H. Popović, ‘Commercialization and Privatization of Media in Southeast Europe: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?’ The Political Economy of Communication, v. 3, n. 1, 2015, ISSN 2357-1705. https://www.polecom.org/index.php/polecom/article/view/49/240

^[8] Z. Peruško, A. Čuvalo and D. Vozab, Journalists in Croatia, Worlds of Journalism Country Report, 2016, https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29703/1/Country_report_Croatia.pdf

^[9] Ž. Ivanuš, Novinarska etičnost pod pritiskom interesnih skupina- iskustva hrvatskih novinara, Media, culture and public relations, 12, 1, p. 73-90, 2021, https://doi.org/10.32914/mcpr.12.1.4

^[10] Article 5 of the Media Act (OG 59/04, 84/11, 81/13, 114/22) and articles 21 and 22 of the Electronic Media Act (OG 111/21, 114/22).

^[11] D. Vozab, Lokalni mediji za bolje društvo. Nacionalni izvještaj-Hrvatska, 2022, https://www.snh.hr/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Istrazivanje-Hrvatska.pdf; Paparella, Ivković Novokmet, Skender,  Državno financiranje bez jasnih kriterija.

^[12] P. Bilić, M. Valečić and T. Prug, Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era- Country report: Croatia, Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 2022, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/74684/MPM2022-Croatia-EN.pdf?sequence=1

^[13] Interview with Maja Sever, June 2023.

The Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia requires that national minorities should have access to media content in their language at least once a week, but this is not implemented well in practice.^[1] The amount of PSM broadcasting in minority languages is not enough to achieve interculturalism. Minorities are underrepresented in the news but when they are represented, they are usually in the news about crime, or accidents. When members of minorities are involved in crime, the media sometimes emphasise ethnicity. There has been less media emphasis on ethnicity in recent years, but ethnicity is revealed and becomes an issue in social media, and this transfers to mainstream media. Besides (partly) public service broadcasters, only minority media (print and online) offer informative content in minority languages (based on the preliminary analysis of the registered media).^[2]

There are few electronic media targeting marginalized groups (e.g. LGBT, women), yet there is no data on their reach or content.[3] Mainstream media either do not represent marginalised groups, or represent them in negative news, or frame them as a problem. There are still problematic terms used by the media concerning members of the LGBT community. Persons with disabilities are mostly invisible in the media, present only when they are advocating for their basic rights. They are never invited to speak as experts in the field or to express their opinions on topics not connected to their disability.^[4]

Local media have a local focus and cover local actors, but there is less diversity in covering different themes and actors; mostly they cover crime stories, economy, health, and local politics. The main actors are mostly men, and elites, local politicians currently in power. Some actors with importance for the local community are rarely covered, like oppositional politicians, civil society actors, trade unions, religious actors, and people from culture, arts, and education.^[5] The most common sources of news are the official sources. Local media audiences (except local radio audiences) interact with local media usually by chance. Another challenge for local media is the lack of sustainable resources, which is one of the main reasons why local programme content is perceived as dull, outdated, and non-innovative.^[6] The most consumed content on local media (television, radio, and online) is news and current affairs, culture, and content about national minorities. Audiences found local media to be the most trusted source of information,^[7] evaluating as best in local media the amount of content about local issues, reliable information, diversity, and quality in content. They are dissatisfied with the way local communities and citizens are represented in content by local radio stations.^[8]

^[1] The exception is Prizma on Croatian public television (HRT), which publishes weekly reports in national minority languages. A local radio branch of the public broadcaster, Radio Pula, regularly broadcasts programmes in the Italian language.

^[2] Croatian Chamber of Economy, Register of Print Media, 2019; AEM, Register of Electronic Media, 2023.

[3] Libela, Portal o rodu, spolu i demokraciji, https://www.libela.org/; Crol, LGBT News portal, https://www.crol.hr/;  Vox Feminae, https://voxfeminae.net/

^[4]  Gordana Vilović, full-time Professor of Journalism at the University of Zagreb, October 2023, phone interview.

^[5] Vozab, Lokalni mediji za bolje društvo. Nacionalni izvještaj-Hrvatska.

^[6] Burić, Desović, Ivišić, Šalinović, Analysis of the Social Impact of the Fund for the Promotion of Pluralism and Diversity of Electronic Media.

^[7] Z. Peruško, Digital News Report for Croatia.

^[8] S. Kunac and V. Roller, ‘Lokalni mediji i demokracija u Hrvatskoj: neiskorišteni potencijal’, In medias res : časopis filozofije medija,  4(6), 2015, 860 – 880.

There is not much data concerning innovation in news media organisations to improve reach and audiences. The analysis found that journalists do not use social media that much for audience participation,^[1] and Croatian universities do not adequately support innovation in media and journalism.^[2] Journalists and editors accept some innovative approaches, like constructive journalism, but there are several obstacles to the implementation of innovation. ^[3]

Croatian media are not keen to experiment with new forms of reporting, media production or distribution, newsroom organisation, or audience engagement, often considering such innovations as a risk in which a lot of resources would be invested, but with unpredictable results. Innovations in Croatian news media organisations mostly happen sporadically, as part of particular projects. A good example is the Croatian public broadcaster (HRT) which, as part of several projects, usually hired external production companies for some innovative projects, but these would not continue after the project ended.^[4]

There is some innovation present in community media, but as this media sector struggles with financial sustainability, these innovation projects are also mostly sporadic and depend on certain funding schemes. Besides the activities of professional journalists’ associations, there are no visible citizen or civil society initiatives addressing media withdrawal from the local level.

^[1] I. Nenadić, Twitter and changing journalistic practice in Croatia, doctoral thesis, Osijek, Sveučilište Josipa Jurja Strossmayera u Osijeku, 2020, https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/1090929.Nenadic_dissertation_FINAL_29062020.pdf

^[2] T. Perišin and P. Mlačić, ‘Studij novinarstva: Digitalni kurikulum za digitalno novinarstvo’, Medijska istraživanja, 20 (1), 2014,  25-45.

^[3] P. Kovačević and T. Perišin, ‘The potential of constructive journalism ideas in a Croatian context’ Journalism Practice, 12(6), 2018, 747-763.

^[4] Petra Kovačević, Department of Journalism and Media Production at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb, June 2023, phone interview.