

Indicator Code B1

Indicator Name Protection of freedom of expression

Description This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression. A country may have good laws relating to freedom of expression, but they may not be implemented or enforced. In addition, constitutional guarantees may be eroded by exceptions and derogations from international treaty obligations or by contradictory laws covering, for example, national security or defamation.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
B1.1 Legal protection of freedom of expression	L	Is freedom of expression explicitly recognized in the Constitution and/or national laws? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression in the Constitution or in national laws.	National laws and regulations. Constitutional conventions. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/

<p>B1.2</p> <p>Legal protection of freedom of expression</p>	<p>L</p> <p>Has the State ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with no significant exemptions?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the ratification of the core international treaty (ICCPR) covering standards on freedom of expression, in particular Article 19. The variable also aims to assess whether there are any reservations/derogations from international treaty obligations, specifically relating to freedom of expression.</p>	<p>Check whether your country has ratified the ICCPR</p> <p>OHCHR website: http://indicators.ohchr.org/</p> <p>Check also whether the state has made any declarations or reservations.</p>
<p>B1.3</p> <p>Legal protection of freedom of expression</p>	<p>L</p> <p>Has the state ratified the European Convention on Human Rights with no significant reservations/declarations?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the ratification of the core European treaty covering freedom of expression: the European Convention on Human Rights. The variable also aims to assess whether there are any reservations/declarations made by the State in relation to freedom of expression, in particular in relation to Article 10.</p>	<p>Check whether the state has ratified the European Convention with no significant reservations/declarations relating to freedom of expression.</p> <p>See Council of Europe webpage: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG</p>
<p>B1.4</p> <p>Legal</p>	<p>L</p> <p>Are restrictions upon freedom of expression</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess legislation restricting freedom of expression on ground of reputation, privacy and</p>	<p>National laws and regulations. Constitutional conventions.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue and reports by international and European bodies.</p>

protection of freedom of expression

clear and narrowly defined in law in accordance with international and regional human rights standards?

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

security. International and European law allow for restrictions on right to freedom of expression in accordance with Art 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. According to Article 10 ECHR restrictions to freedom of expression must be: "prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary"; while Article 19 ICCPR allows for restrictions on freedom of expression, which must be provided by law and necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on the websites listed under B1.1

B1.5 Legal protection of freedom of expression	L	<p>Is the scope of defamation laws defined as narrowly as possible, including as to whom may sue?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the scope of defamation laws in your country, which should always be defined as narrowly as possible. In particular defamation laws are justified only if their legitimate aim is to protect a natural person whose reputation has been harmed. Therefore defamation laws should not serve interests other than reputation and should only be brought by natural persons, and not by public bodies whether legislative, executive or judicial).</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>National case law, relevant case law by European Court on Human Rights.</p> <p>CMPF maps on defamation, available at: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/defamation-law/ (please check for any updated information)</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue and reports by international and European bodies.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on the websites listed under B1.1</p>
B1.5.1 Legal protection of freedom of expression	L	<p>Has the State decriminalised defamation?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the state has decriminalised defamation. While defamation is an important tool to protect people from false statements that damage their reputation, its criminalization may pose risks for journalists' freedom of expression or their ability to carry out their work.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations, case law.</p> <p>CMPF maps on defamation, available at: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/defamation-law/ (please check for any updated information)</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue and reports by international and European bodies.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on the websites listed under B1.1</p>

<p>B1.5.2</p> <p>Legal protection of freedom of expression</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Do defamation laws provide for sufficient legal defences?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether defamation laws provide for sufficient legal defences, that can be used against a defamation claim, to ensure it does not impose unreasonable limitations on freedom of expression. These may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - that the disputed statement was an opinion, not an allegation of fact; - that publication or broadcasting of the disputed fact was reasonable or in the public interest; - or that it occurred during a live transmission and/or before a court or elected body 	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>National case law, relevant case law by European Court on Human Rights.</p> <p>CMPF maps on defamation, available at: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/defamation-law/ (please check for any updated information)</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue and reports by international and European bodies.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on the websites listed under B1.1</p>
<p>B1.6</p> <p>Legal protection of freedom of expression</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Do citizens have specific legal remedies in cases of infringement of their freedom of expression?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the availability of legal remedies in cases of violations of freedom of expression. The variable measures solely the existence in law, not its implementation.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations. Constitutional conventions. Case law</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;</p>

on	YES NO Not Applicable No Data		Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/
<p>B1.6.1</p> <p>Legal protection of freedom of expression</p>	<p>L</p> <p>Are these legal remedies effective?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: Effective, the system works</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: The system works with occasional delays or limitations to access</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: Legal remedies are not effective</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of legal remedies against violations of freedom of expression. Unless legal remedies are effective and adequately enforced, regulatory safeguards on freedom of expression may be useless.</p>	<p>National case law and case law of the European Court on Human Rights.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue and reports by NGOs working on related issues.</p>
<p>B1.7</p> <p>Legal protection</p>	<p>S</p> <p>Are there cases of violations of freedom</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the actual risks to freedom of expression in your country. It also aims to measure the concrete effects of the laws</p>	<p>National case law. Case law by European Court on Human Rights on your country.</p>

<p>n of freedom of expression</p>	<p>of expression in your country?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: No evidence of violations</p> <p>Medium risk: Occasional violations</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: Systematic violations</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <p>safeguarding freedom of expression in your country. While adequate laws may be in place, they may not be effective or implemented in practice. Of course every country may witness minor violations to freedom of expression, but if there has been a systematic practice over the two years this will indicate that the laws may be ineffective.</p> <p>Please note that the relevant timeframe is two years and it is looking for common practice, not based on one single incident.</p>	<p>Reports by local and international NGOs working on these issues.</p> <p>Academic writing and reports by international bodies, organizations or experts on the issue.</p>
<p>B1.8 Legal protection of freedom of expression</p>	<p>S</p> <p>Are there cases of violations of freedom of expression online?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: No evidence of violations</p> <p>Medium risk: Some violations</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <p>This variable aims to assess whether there has been any form of violation to freedom of expression on the internet in the past two years. Violations of freedom of expression online are growing in frequency and importance. Examples may include filtering practices, the blocking of websites, and/or censorship on social networks.</p> <p>Please note that the relevant timeframe is two years and it is looking for common practice, not based on one</p>	<p>National case law. Case law by European Court on Human Rights on your country.</p> <p>Reports by local and international NGOs working on these issues.</p> <p>Academic writing and reports by international bodies, organizations or experts on the issue.</p>

High risk:
Systematic/
erious
violations

single incident.

Indicator Code

B2

Indicator Name

Protection of right to information

Description

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards relating to the right to information. A country may have good laws relating to the right to information but they may not be implemented or enforced

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
B2.1 Legal protection of right to information	L	Is the right to information explicitly recognised in the Constitution and/or national laws? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for the right to information in the Constitution or in national laws.	National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements...), constitutional conventions, case law, regulatory decisions. CMPF Maps on Freedom of Information: http://journalism.cmpf.eu.eu/maps/freedom-of-information/ Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

EPRA website: <http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>.

<http://www.rti-rating.org/>

B2.2	L	Are restrictions to freedom of information on grounds of protection of personal privacy narrowly defined in accordance with international standards?	This variable aims to assess whether restrictions to freedom of information on privacy grounds provided in national law are narrowly defined in accordance with international standards. Both the right to freedom of information, including the public's right to be informed by the press, and the right to privacy enjoy a high degree of protection under international law. Although both human rights, they are by no means absolute. Notwithstanding the public's interest in the lives of	<p>National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements...), constitutional conventions, case law, regulatory decisions. (As above).</p> <p>Also policy documents</p> <p>Council of Europe (2002). Recommendation Rec(2002)2 on access to official documents by the Committee of Ministers,</p> <p>Council of Europe (1994). Recommendation No. R (94) 13 on measures to promote media transparency, 22 November 1994</p> <p>Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating safeguards for the right to information</p>
Legal protection of right to information		<hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>		

certain individuals, the dissemination of this information should not always come at the cost of invading their privacy.

As noted by the former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression Frank La Rue, "The overarching notion is that all information in the possession of the State belongs to the public, with limited and qualified exceptions that must be justified by State authorities. [...] National laws should contain a clearly and narrowly defined list of exceptions or an explanation of the grounds for refusing the disclosure of information. Exceptions should apply only where there is a risk of substantial harm to the protected interest and where that harm is greater than the overall public interest in having access to the information, and should be determined by an independent body, preferably a court, and not the body holding the information".

OSCE (2008). Access to information by the media in the OSCE region: Country Reports,

http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2007/06/24251_en.pdf

Websites providing more information

www.ifj.org

www.freedominfo.org

<http://www.rti-rating.org/>

<p>B2.3</p> <p>Legal protection of right to information</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Are there appeal mechanisms in place for denials to access information?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether there are appeal mechanisms in place in cases of denials to access information. Such appeal mechanism should be before a judicial body or if not, before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements...), constitutional conventions, case law, regulatory decisions.</p> <p>CMPF Maps on Freedom of Information: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/freedom-of-information/</p> <p>http://www.rti-rating.org/</p>
<p>B2.3.1</p> <p>Legal protection of right to information</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Are the procedures of the appeal mechanisms systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies against violations of the right to information?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: the procedures are never</p> <p>Not Applicable </p>	<p>While appeal mechanisms in cases of denials of access to information may be in place, this does not necessarily mean they are effective. This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms in place and test whether they are subject to</p>	<p>National case law and case law of the European Court on Human Rights.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue and reports by NGOs working on related issues.</p>

misused

No Data

systematic misuse or delays.

Medium risk:
the procedures are
occasionally misused

High risk:
the procedures are
systematically misused

B2.4 Legal protection of right to information	S	Are there cases of violations of right to information in your country?	Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess the actual risks to freedom of information in your country. It also aims to measure the concrete effects of the laws safeguarding freedom of information in your country. While adequate laws may be in place, they may not be effective or implemented in practice. Of course every country may witness minor violations to freedom of information, but if there has been a systematic practice over the past two years this will indicate that the laws may be ineffective.	National case law. Case law by European Court on Human Rights on your country. Reports by local and international NGOs working on these issues. Academic writing and reports by international bodies, organizations or experts on the issue.
		Low risk: No evidence of regular violations			
		Medium risk: Some evidence of regular violations			
		High risk: Clear patterns of systematic/serious violations		Please note that the relevant timeframe is two years and it is looking for common	

practice, not based on one single incident.

Indicator Code B4

Indicator Name Journalistic profession, standards and protection

Description This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards for journalistic practice. This indicator focuses on several different pillars: criteria to become a journalist, professional associations, editorial independence and protection of journalists and their sources.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
B4.1 Access to	L	Is access to journalistic profession open?	This variable aims to assess legal restrictions on who can become a journalist, since these may have a deterring effect and hence a negative influence on media	National laws and regulations. Constitutional conventions. National case law and case law of European Court on

journalistic profession	YES NO Not Applicable No Data	<p>pluralism. In particular it aims to measure whether the laws or self-regulatory instruments that prescribe who may practice journalism or requiring the licensing or registration of journalists impose transparent, objective, proportionate (not synonym for strict conditions; e.g. diploma is a proportionate condition) and nondiscriminatory requirements. Such legal restrictions may include may include burdensome accreditation, registration or licensing schemes.</p>	<p>Human Rights</p> <p>Self-regulatory instruments.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation and self-regulatory codes can be found on:</p> <p>http://www.mediawise.org.uk/codes-of-conduct/codes/</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>CMPF map on the status of journalists: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/journalists-status/</p>
B4.2 Access to journalistic profession	S Is access to the journalistic profession open in practice? Low risk: The conditions to Not Applicable	<p>This variable aims to assess practical restrictions on who can become a journalist, since these may also have a deterring effect and hence a negative influence on media pluralism. In particular it aims to measure whether the implementation of the laws or self-regulatory instruments allowing transparent, objective, proportionate and nondiscriminatory requirements is adequate in practice, and whether any other barriers exist to exercise the</p>	<p>National case law</p> <p>Case law of the European Court on human Rights</p> <p>Reports by NGOs and international organizations working on the issue</p> <p>Interviews with journalists</p>

become a
journalist
impose no
barriers to
exercise the
profession of
journalists

No Data

profession of journalists. While the legal protection may be adequate, this may not be the case in practice.

Medium risk:
The
conditions to
become a
journalist
impose some
barriers to
exercise the
profession of
journalists

High risk:
The
conditions to
become a
journalist
impose
serious
barriers to
exercise the
profession of
journalists

<p>B4.3</p> <p>Professional associations</p>	<p>S</p> <p>Is a broad section of journalists represented by professional associations or other journalists' organizations?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess if the representation of the interests of media professionals and media employers in labour relations is established through professional associations, with high levels of participation of media professionals and media publishers in their membership.</p>	<p>National data on journalists, and relevant organizations.</p> <p>For relevant data see also: CMPF map on the Status of European Journalists: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/journalists-status/ (please indicate if information must be updated)</p>
<p>Low risk: All or almost all journalists are represented</p>		<p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <p>For a definition of journalists' associations see CMPF map on the Status of European Journalists: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/journalists-status/</p> <p>These include journalist associations and self-regulatory bodies.</p>	
<p>Medium risk: Some journalists are represented</p>			
<p>High risk: Journalists are not represented</p>			
<p>B4.4</p> <p>Professional associations</p>	<p>S</p> <p>Are they effective in guaranteeing editorial independence and/or respect for professional standards?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess if there are professional associations providing advocacy for editorial independence and/or respect for professional standards. It aims to assess the power and effectiveness of the relevant associations in influencing the journalistic sphere.</p>	<p>Reports by NGOs or journalist organizations.</p> <p>Interviews with journalist organizations.</p>

Low risk:
Highly effective

Medium risk:
Partially effective

High risk:
Not effective

Not
Applicable
|
No Data

Other relevant websites:

www.ifj.org

www.ijnet.org

B4.5

S

Protection of journalists

Are there cases of attacks or threats to the physical safety of journalists?

Low risk:
No attacks, no threats

Medium risk:
No attacks, some threats

High risk:
Attacks and threats take place

Not
Applicable
|
No Data

The physical safety of journalists is essential to guarantee their freedom of expression and media pluralism. As noted in the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity : "In recent years, there has been disquieting evidence of the scale and number of attacks against the physical safety of journalists and media workers"

The relevant timeframe should be two years.

Reports by international organizations and NGOs.

Interviews with journalists or relevant organizations.

B4.6 Protection of journalists	S	Are there threats to the digital safety of journalists?	Threats to digital safety have become a serious concern for journalists. In particular digital surveillance endangers the work of journalists and their freedom of expression. This variable aims to assess the presence of threats to the digital safety of journalists, including through illegitimate surveillance of their searches and online activities, their email or social media profiles, hacking and attacks by state or non-state actors.	Reports by international organizations and NGOs. Interviews with journalists or relevant organizations. Case law
		Low risk: No attacks	Not Applicable	
		Medium risk: Some attacks	No Data	
		High risk: Frequent attacks		
B4.7 Working Conditions	S	How would you evaluate the working conditions of journalists in your country?	For a genuine pluralistic media landscape to be realised, it is crucial that journalists can work under good social conditions. This variable aims to assess risks to the working conditions of journalists, including in particular their social security, job security and pay.	CMPF maps on the status of journalists: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/journalists-status/ Interviews with journalists or journalists' organizations. Reports by NGOs or professional associations/unions.
		Low risk: Good job security and pay	Not Applicable	
		Medium risk: Some irregularities in payments	No Data	

and some job insecurity

High risk:
Frequent irregularities in payments and high job insecurity

B4.8	L	Are there any mechanisms granting social protection to journalists in case of changes of ownership or editorial line?	This variable aims to assess whether there are any laws or self-regulatory instruments granting social protection to journalists in cases of changes in ownership or editorial line. If journalists' risk losing their employment in such events, their working conditions must be considered insecure and at risk.	National laws and regulations. Contracts. National case law. Self-regulatory instruments.
Working Conditions		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

B4.9	L	Are there any laws or self-regulatory codes prohibiting commercial parties from influencing, or seeking to influence editorial content?	This variable assesses whether editorial decisions are made by media organisations on the basis of professional criteria and the public's right to know without undue commercial interference (from the owner of the media company or commercial entities).	National laws and regulations. Contracts. National case law. Self-regulatory instruments.
Editorial content		YES NO Not		

Applicable |
No Data

B4.10 Editorial content	S	Is there evidence that commercial entities or the owner of the media company systematically influence, or seek to influence, the editorial content of broadcasters or press?	<p>This variable aims to assess whether commercial entities or the owners of media companies generally abstain from influencing editorial content. It is not looking at influence by political parties/politicians.</p> <p>Please note that the relevant timeframe is two years and it is looking for common practice, not based on one single incident.</p>	<p>Report by NGOs or other relevant organizations.</p> <p>Interviews with journalists and editors/publishers.</p>
		<p>Low risk: They generally abstain from influencing editorial content</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	
		<p>Medium risk: They sometimes try to influence editorial content</p>		
		<p>High risk: They systematicall</p>		

y influence
editorial
content

B4.11 Protection of sources	L	Is the protection of journalistic sources explicitly recognised by the law and/or by the highest courts in your country?	<p>This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for the protection of journalistic sources. In some countries the protection of sources may be recognised in the case law of the highest courts even if it is not explicitly recognised in national legal instruments.</p> <p>Both in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and in Recommendation (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, it is recognised that the protection of journalists' sources of information constitutes a basic condition for journalistic work and freedom as well as for the freedom of the media. To promote the development of free, independent and pluralist media, it is necessary for journalists to have the right not to disclose their sources of information.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations. Constitutional conventions.</p> <p>National case law and case law of European Court on Human Rights</p> <p>Self-regulatory instruments.</p> <p>CMPF map on the protection of journalistic sources: http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/protection-of-sources/</p> <p>Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating safeguards for the protection of journalistic sources:</p> <p>For instance: IFJ (2010), Protecting our sources of information. The updated version is available at: http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/efj-policy-document-on-protection-of-sources</p> <p>Banisar, D. (2007). Silencing Sources: An International Survey of Protections and Threats to Journalists' Sources, available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1706688</p>
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

<p>B4.12</p> <p>Protection of sources</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Is the protection of journalistic sources generally enforced in practice?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the effective implementation of regulatory safeguards for the protection of journalistic sources. While a country may have adequate laws on the protection of journalistic sources, they may not be implemented in practice. If journalists cannot guarantee a source's anonymity, journalists may not be able to report at all.</p>	<p>National case law and case law by European Court on Human Rights</p> <p>NGO reports</p>
	<p>Low risk: The protection of journalistic sources is enforced in practice</p>	<p>Not Applicable</p> <p>Evidence of systematic infringement may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - when there is a number of cases where journalists were obliged to disclose their sources and were condemned for not disclosing their sources; - or cases where the Member State did not take measures after a conviction by the European Court on Human Rights for systematic use of domiciliary visits and telephone tapping of journalists. 	<p>Council of Europe (2000). Recommendation REC (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, 8 March 2000</p> <p>Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating safeguards for the protection of journalistic sources:</p> <p>For instance: IFJ (2010), Protecting our sources of information. The updated version is available at: http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/efj-policy-document-on-protection-of-sources</p>	
	<p>Medium risk: There are some infringements of the protection of journalist sources and journalists are occasionally obliged to disclose their sources</p>	<p>Please note that the relevant timeframe is two years and it is looking for common practice, not based on one single incident.</p>	<p>Banisar, D. (2007). Silencing Sources: An International Survey of Protections and Threats to Journalists' Sources, available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=170668</p>	
	<p>High risk: There is systematic infringement</p>			

of the
protection of
sources and
there are a
number of
cases in
which
journalists
have been
obliged to
disclose their
sources or
have been
condemned
for not
disclosing
them.

Indicator Code	B5
Indicator Name	Independence and effectiveness of national authority
Description	This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards for the independence and efficiency of the relevant authority(-ies) in the media field. In particular, it looks at the independence and efficiency of the media, competition and telecommunications authorities. Independence, transparency and effectiveness are crucial elements that should be guaranteed in order for the three authorities to act as watchmen of media pluralism and freedom.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
B5.1 Media authority	Filter	<p>Is there a designated media authority in your country?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether there is media authority in your country. Not all countries have a specifically designated media regulator. If one exists in your country a series of questions will follow about the independence and effectiveness of the media authority.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p>
B5.2 Media authority	L	<p>Are there any explicit constitutional or legal guarantees of independence of the media authority from political or commercial interference?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for the independence of the media authority. The ability of a media authority to exercise its powers impartially and transparently is crucial to ensure media pluralism. An</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p>

independent media authority may not be part of a governmental administration, and must have its own 'apparatus' and resources which do not serve any other body. Members of media authorities should also avoid exercising functions or holding interests in enterprises or other organisations in the media or related sectors, which might lead to a conflict of interest in connection with membership of the media authority. Furthermore, there should be rules to guarantee that the members of the media authority may not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, do not make any statement or undertake any action which may prejudice the independence of

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

Hans Bredow Institute et al. (2011). Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies. Study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, findings available at: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

Council of Europe (2008). Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 26 March 2008, available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1266737&Site=CM>

Council of Europe (2000). Council of Europe (2000). Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 26 March 2008, available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1266737&Site=CM>

Council of Europe REC (2000) 23 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 20 December 2000 and efficiency of the media authority (-ies), available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=393649&>

Related studies/Reports: Cullen International (2006). Study on the regulation of broadcasting issues under the new regulatory framework prepared for the European Commission Information Society and Media Directorate-General.

Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at:

its functions and do not take any advantage of them. <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence>

B5.3 Media authority	L	Are appointment procedures for the media authority transparent, democratic and objective and designed to minimize the risk of political or commercial interference, for instance by including rules on incompatibility and eligibility?	This variable also aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for the independence of the media authority. In particular it aims to assess the existence of rules to guarantee that the members of the media authority are appointed in a democratic and transparent manner, may not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, do not make any statement or undertake any action which may prejudice the independence of its functions and do not take any advantage of them.	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation Websites of national regulatory authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/ Hans Bredow Institute et al. (2011). Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies. Study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, findings available at: http://www.indireg.eu/ Council of Europe (2008). Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 26 March 2008, available at:
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1266737&Site=CM>
Council of Europe (2000).

Council of Europe REC (2000) 23 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 20 December 2000 and efficiency of the media authority (-ies), available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=393649&>

Related studies/Reports: Cullen International (2006). Study on the regulation of broadcasting issues under the new regulatory framework prepared for the European Commission Information Society and Media Directorate-General.

B5.4 Media authority	S	Are the appointment procedures for the media authority respected in practice?	This variable aims to assess whether the rules regulating the appointment procedures to the media authority are implemented in practice and whether they effectively guarantee that the members of the media authority are appointed in a democratic and transparent manner, do not receive any	EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/ Websites of national regulatory authorities; NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations. National case law. Academic writing on the issue. Interviews with relevant actors.
		Low risk: The appointment procedures are fully respected	Not Applicable No Data	
		Medium risk: The appointment procedures are generally respected but are not always effective in safeguarding		

independence

High risk:
The appointment procedures are not respected

mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, and are effectively independent. Members of media authorities should also avoid exercising functions or holding interests in enterprises or other organisations in the media or related sectors, which might lead to a conflict of interest in connection with membership of the media authority.

B5.5 Media authority	L	Are the procedures for allocation of budgetary resources for the media authority transparent and objective, i.e. leaving no scope for arbitrary decisions by the governing powers?	This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards concerning the procedures of budget allocation for the media authority. Arrangements for the funding of the media authority should be specified in law in accordance with a	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ Websites of national regulatory authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

clearly defined plan, with reference to the estimated cost of its activities, so as to allow the authority to carry out its functions fully and independently. Public authorities should not use their financial decision-making power to interfere with the independence of the media authority.

Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

Hans Bredow Institute et al. (2011). Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies. Study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, findings available at: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

Council of Europe (2008). Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 26 March 2008, available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1266737&Site=CM>
Council of Europe (2000).

Council of Europe REC (2000) 23 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 20 December 2000 and efficiency of the media authority (-ies), available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=393649&>

Related studies/Reports: Cullen International (2006). Study on the regulation of broadcasting issues under the new regulatory framework prepared for the European Commission Information Society and Media Directorate-General.

Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at: <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence>

B5.6 Media authority	S	Is the budget adequate and consistent for the media authority to safeguard its independence and/or protect it from coercive budgetary pressures and to perform its functions?	This variable aims to assess whether the budget allocated for the media authority is adequate to safeguard its independence	<p>check annual reports of the media authority</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/</p> <p>transparencyinternational.org</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National case law.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue.</p> <p>Interviews with relevant actors.</p>
		<p>Low risk: The budget is adequate</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p>		
		<p>Medium risk: The budget is somewhat inadequate but still allows it to perform its function</p>		
		<p>High risk: The budget is not adequate and does not safeguard its independence</p>		
B5.7 Media authority	L	Are the tasks, duties and responsibilities of the media authority defined in detail in the law?	This variable aims to assess the existence of laws and regulations clearly defining the tasks, duties and responsibilities of the media authority (-ies). These may include regulatory powers and/or the power to grant licences, compliance	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		

monitoring, including
sanctioning powers.

Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian
countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

Hans Bredow Institute et al. (2011). Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies. Study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, findings available at: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

Council of Europe (2008). Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 26 March 2008, available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1266737&Site=CM>
Council of Europe (2000).

Council of Europe REC (2000) 23 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector, 20 December 2000 and efficiency of the media authority (-ies), available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=393649&>

Related studies/Reports: Cullen International (2006). Study on the regulation of broadcasting issues under the new regulatory framework prepared for the European Commission Information Society and Media Directorate-General.

Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at: <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence>

<p>B5.8 Media authority</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Does regulation attribute sanctioning powers to the media authority?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess specifically whether the law attributes sanctioning powers to the authority. Sanctioning powers may include warning, fine, suspension or revocation of licence, refusal of additional licences, blocking of a merger or acquisition, obligation to allocate windows for third party programming, obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors, and/or divestiture.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>Hans Bredow Institute et al. (2011). Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies. Study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, findings available at: http://www.indireg.eu/</p>
<p>B5.9 Media authority</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>With regard to the media authority decisions, are there appeal mechanisms in place?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the existence of mechanisms of appeal of the decisions by the media authority. The appeal mechanisms should be before a judicial body</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>National case law.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p>

			<p>or before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.</p>	<p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>Hans Bredow Institute et al. (2011). Indicators for independence and efficient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies. Study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, findings available at: http://www.indireg.eu/</p>
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B5.9.1	L	<p>Are the appeal mechanisms effective and not systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: Appeal mechanisms are effective and not misused</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: Appeal mechanisms are partially effective and/or are occasionally delayed</p> <hr/> <p>High risk:</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms indicated above. Appeal mechanisms may be in place but systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies. If there are no appeal mechanisms in place please tick not applicable and indicate this in the comment box.</p>	<p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National and European case law.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue.</p>
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Appeal mechanisms are not effective and/or are systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies

<p>B5.10 Media authority</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Does the decisional practice of the media authority indicate that the authority uses its powers in practice in the interest of the public?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the practice of the media authority indicates that it uses its powers in the interest of the public.</p>	<p>The answer should be based on a concrete assessment of its decisional practice and other elements, such as whether the media authority has ever been condemned after an investigation by anti-corruption bodies.</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National and European case law.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue.</p> <p>http://www.transparencyinternational.org/</p> <p>Interviews with relevant actors.</p>
		<p>Low risk: The media authority effectively uses its powers in the interest of the public</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	
		<p>Medium risk: The authority's powers are not always used in the interest of the public</p>		
		<p>High risk: The authority's powers are never used in the interest of the public</p>		

<p>B5.11 Media authority</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Is there evidence that the Government can arbitrarily overrule decisions by the media authority?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the government in your country arbitrarily overrules decisions by the media authority. Decisions to overrule are considered arbitrary if they are not foreseen by law, not reasonable or in bad faith.</p>	<p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/ Websites of national regulatory authorities; NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations. National and European case law. Academic writing on the issue. Interviews with relevant actors.</p>
		<p>Low risk: The government never overrules decisions by the media authority</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	
		<p>Medium risk: The government at times arbitrarily overrules decisions by the media authority</p>		
		<p>High risk: The government regularly overrules arbitrarily decisions by the media authority</p>		
<p>B5.12 Media authority</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Is the media authority transparent about its activities?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the media authority is transparent about its activities and therefore accountable to the public. being transparent about its activities, may include the publication of its</p>	<p>National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p>
		<p>Low risk: It is transparent and regularly publishes information about its activities</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	

Medium risk:
It is generally transparent but does not publish information about its activities on a regular basis

High risk:
It is not transparent

activities, including through regular or ad hoc reports relevant to their work or the exercise of their missions.

NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.

National and European case law.

Academic writing on the issue.

B5.13
Media authority

S

Is the media authority accountable to the government/parliament for its activities?

Low risk:
It is accountable and regularly publishes reports about its work and/or the government/parliament can order an audit of the regulator

Medium risk:
it is partly accountable

High risk:
it is not accountable

Not Applicable |
No Data

This variable aims to assess whether the media authority is accountable to the government and/or parliament for its activities. Forms of accountability may include publishing regular or ad hoc reports relevant to its work or the exercise of its mission. Procedures for checks and balances may also include whether the government / parliament can order an audit of the regulator, and/or whether the regulator has to prepare a yearly

National laws and regulations.

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

EPRA website:<http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

EU Study: INDIREG: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

Websites of national regulatory authorities;

NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.

National and European case law.

Academic writing on the issue.

activity report that is discussed in parliament (but that does not need to be approved by government or parliament).

B5.14	Filter	Is the competition authority in your country involved in the regulation of the media sector?	This variable aims to assess whether the competition authority in your country is also responsible for the regulation of the media sector. If it is a series of questions will follow about the independence and effectiveness of the competition authority.	<p>National laws and regulations. regulatory decisions</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>Websites of national competition authorities</p> <p>ECN</p>
Competition authority		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

B5.15 Competition authority	L	Are there any explicit constitutional or legal guarantees of independence of the competition authority from political or commercial interference?	This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for the independence of the competition authority. Competition authorities need to be granted independent status from the political sphere to ensure that the application and enforcement of competition rules is mainly based upon economic and legal arguments alone, and not shaped by political pressure. This is not only crucial to realise competition law objectives, but also to ensure media pluralism, to the extent that the former may positively contribute to the latter. Therefore members of the competition authority should avoid	National laws and regulations. regulatory decisions Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ Websites of national regulatory authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/ Websites of national competition authorities Studies: Van De Gronden, J., & De Vries, S. (2006). Independent competition authorities in the EU. <i>Utrecht Law Review</i> ; Council of Europe (2000) Recommendation No. R (2000) 23, on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector., Vol 2 (1) 32. 67 OECD (1993).
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

exercising functions or holding interests in enterprises or other organisations in the media or related sectors, which might lead to a conflict of interest in connection with membership of the competition authority. Furthermore, rules should guarantee that the members of the competition authority do not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, do not make any statement or undertake any action which may prejudice the independence of its functions and do not take any advantage of them.

Competition policy and a changing broadcast industry,
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/63/2376152.pdf>

ECN

webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

B5.16 Competition	L	Are the appointment procedures for the	This variable also aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for	National laws and regulations. regulatory decisions Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:
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<p>authority</p>	<p>competition authority transparent, democratic and objective and designed to minimize the risk of political or commercial interference, for instance by including rules on incompatibility and eligibility?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>the independence of the competition authority. In particular it aims to assess the existence of rules to guarantee that the members of the competition authority are appointed in a democratic and transparent manner, may not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, do not make any statement or undertake any action which may prejudice the independence of its functions and do not take any advantage of them.</p>	<p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>Websites of national competition authorities</p> <p>Van De Gronden, J., & De Vries, S. (2006). Independent competition authorities in the EU. Utrecht Law Review;</p> <p>Council of Europe (2000) Recommendation No. R (2000) 23, on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector., Vol 2 (1) 32. 67 OECD (1993).</p> <p>ECN webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html</p>
<p>B5.17 Competition authority</p>	<p>S</p> <p>Are the appointment procedures for the competition authority respected in practice, providing guarantees of independence?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: The appointment procedures are fully</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the rules regulating the appointment procedures to the competition authority are implemented in practice and whether</p>	<p>National laws and regulations. regulatory decisions</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p>

respected

Medium risk:
The appointment procedures are generally respected but are not always effective in safeguarding independence

High risk:
The appointment procedures are not respected in practice

they effectively guarantee that the members of the media authority are appointed in a democratic and transparent manner, do not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, and are effectively independent. Members of the competition authority should avoid exercising functions or holding interests in enterprises or other organisations in the media or related sectors, which might lead to a conflict of interest in connection with membership of the competition authority.

Websites of national regulatory authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

Websites of national competition authorities

Interviews with relevant actors.

Van De Gronden, J., & De Vries, S. (2006). Independent competition authorities in the EU. *Utrecht Law Review*;

Council of Europe (2000) Recommendation No. R (2000) 23, on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector., Vol 2 (1) 32. 67 OECD (1993).

ECN

webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

B5.18 Competition	L Are the procedures for allocation of budgetary	Arrangements for the funding of the competition authority	National laws and regulations. regulatory decisions Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:
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<p>authority</p>	<p>resources for the competition authority transparent and objective?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>should be specified in law in accordance with a clearly defined plan, with reference to the estimated cost of its activities, so as to allow the authority to carry out its functions fully and independently. Public authorities should not use their financial decision-making power to interfere with the independence of the competition authority. i.e. leaving no scope for arbitrary decisions by the governing powers</p>	<p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>Websites of national competition authorities</p> <p>Van De Gronden, J., & De Vries, S. (2006). Independent competition authorities in the EU. Utrecht Law Review;</p> <p>Council of Europe (2000) Recommendation No. R (2000) 23, on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector., Vol 2 (1) 32. 67 OECD (1993).</p> <p>ECN webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html</p>
<p>B5.19 Competition authority</p>	<p>S</p> <p>Is the budget adequate and consistent for the competition authority to safeguard its independence and/or protect it from coercive budgetary pressures and to perform its functions?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: Not Applicable </p> <hr/>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the budget allocated for the competition authority is adequate to safeguard its independence. Public authorities should not</p>	<p>Websites of national competition authorities</p> <p>Reports by competition authority</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National case and European law.</p>

The budget is adequate

No Data

use their financial decision-making power to interfere with the independence of the competition authority.

Academic writing on the issue.

EU Study: INDIREG: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

Interviews with relevant actors.

ECN

webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

Medium risk:

The budget is somewhat inadequate but still allows it to perform its function

High risk:

The budget is not adequate and does not safeguard its independence

B5.20

L

Competition authority

Are the tasks, duties and responsibilities of the competition authority defined in detail in the law?

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

This variable aims to assess the existence of laws and regulations clearly defining the tasks, duties and responsibilities of the competition authority. These may include regulatory powers and/or the power to grant licences, compliance monitoring, including sanctioning powers.

National laws and regulations. regulatory decisions

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

EPRA website: <http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

EU Study: INDIREG: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

Websites of national regulatory authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

Websites of national competition authorities

				<p>Van De Gronden, J., & De Vries, S. (2006). Independent competition authorities in the EU. <i>Utrecht Law Review</i>;</p> <p>Council of Europe (2000) Recommendation No. R (2000) 23, on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector., Vol 2 (1) 32. 67 OECD (1993).</p> <p>ECN webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html</p>
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B5.21	L	Does the law attribute sanctioning powers to the competition authority?	This indicator aims to assess specifically whether the law attributes sanctioning powers to the authority. Sanctioning powers may include warning, fine, suspension or revocation of licence, refusal of additional licences, blocking of a merger or acquisition, obligation to allocate windows for third party programming, obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors, and/or divestiture.	<p>National laws and regulations. regulatory decisions</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>Websites of national competition authorities</p> <p>Van De Gronden, J., & De Vries, S. (2006). Independent</p>
Competition authority		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

competition authorities in the EU. Utrecht Law Review;

Council of Europe (2000) Recommendation No. R (2000) 23, on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector., Vol 2 (1) 32. 67
OECD (1993).

ECN

webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

B5.22 Competition authority	L	With regard to the competition authority decisions, are there effective appeal mechanisms in place?	This variable aims to assess the existence of mechanisms of appeal of the decisions by the competition authority. The appeal mechanisms should be before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.	National laws and regulations. regulatory decisions Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ Websites of national regulatory authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/ Websites of national competition authorities Van De Gronden, J., & De Vries, S. (2006). Independent
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

competition authorities in the EU. Utrecht Law Review;

Council of Europe (2000) Recommendation No. R (2000) 23, on the independence and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector., Vol 2 (1) 32. 67
OECD (1993).

ECN

webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

B5.22.1

L

Competition authority

Are the appeal mechanisms effective and not systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies?

Low risk:
Appeal mechanisms are effective and not misused

Not Applicable |
No Data

Medium risk:
Appeal mechanisms are partially effective and/or are occasionally delayed

High risk:
Appeal mechanisms are not effective and/or are systematically misused to delay the enforcement of

This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms indicated above.

Appeal mechanisms may be in place but systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies. If there are no appeal mechanisms in place, please tick not applicable and indicate this in the comment box.

Websites of national competition authorities

NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.

National and European case law.

Academic writing on the issue.

EU Study: INDIREG: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

EPRA website: <http://www.epra.org/>

ECN

webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

remedies

<p>B5.23 Competition authority</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Does decisional practice of the competition authority indicate that the authority effectively uses its powers in consumers' interest?</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the practice of the competition authority indicates that it uses its powers in the interest of the consumers. The answer should be based on a concrete assessment of its decisional practice and other elements, such as whether the competition authority has ever been condemned after an investigation by anti-corruption bodies.</p>	<p>Websites of national competition authorities</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National and European case law.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue.</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/</p> <p>http://www.transparencyinternational.org/</p> <p>Interviews with relevant actors.</p> <p>ECN webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html</p>
<p>B5.24 Competition authority</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Is there evidence that the Government can arbitrarily overrule decisions by the competition authority?</p>	<p>Not Applicable </p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the government in your country arbitrarily overrules decisions by the competition</p>	<p>Websites of national competition authorities</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National and European case law.</p>
<p>Low risk: The competition authority effectively uses its powers in the interest of the consumers</p>	<p>Medium risk: The authority's powers are not always used effectively in the interest of the consumers</p>	<p>High risk: The authority's powers are not used in the interest of the consumers</p>			

The government never overrules decisions by the competition authority

No Data

authority. Decisions to overrule are considered arbitrary if they are not foreseen by law, not reasonable or in bad faith.

Academic writing on the issue.

EU Study: INDIREG: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

EPRA website:<http://www.epra.org/>

Interviews with relevant actors.

ECN webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

Medium risk:

The government at times arbitrarily overrules decisions by the competition authority

High risk:

The government regularly overrules arbitrarily decisions by the competition authority

B5.25
Telecommunications authority

L

Are there any explicit constitutional or legal guarantees of independence of the telecommunications authority from political or commercial interference?

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for the independence of the telecommunications authority. Member States have an obligation under the electronic communications regulatory framework to guarantee the independence of their national regulatory authority (-ies) by

National laws and regulations.

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

EPRA website:<http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

EU Study: INDIREG: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

Websites of national telecommunications authorities;

DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework

ensuring that they are legally distinct from and functionally independent of all organisations providing electronic communications networks, equipment or services, and by ensuring that national regulatory authorities exercise their power impartially and transparently. This is not only crucial to realise the policy objectives set in the electronic communications sector, but also serves media pluralism. Therefore members of the telecommunications authority should avoid exercising functions or holding interests in enterprises or other organisations in the media or related sectors, which might lead to a conflict of interest in connection with membership of

Directive), available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/140framework_5.pdf

<http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx>

the telecommunications authority. Furthermore, rules should guarantee that the members of the telecommunications do not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, do not make any statement or undertake any action which may prejudice the independence of its functions and do not take any advantage of them.

B5.26 Telecommunications authority	L	Are the appointment procedures for the telecommunications authority transparent, democratic and objective and designed to minimize the risk of political or commercial interference, for instance by including rules on incompatibility and eligibility?	This variable also aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for the independence of the telecommunications authority. In particular it aims to assess the existence of rules to guarantee that the members of the	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

telecommunications authority are appointed in a democratic and transparent manner, may not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, do not make any statement or undertake any action which may prejudice the independence of its functions and do not take any advantage of them.

Websites of national telecommunications authorities;

DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/140framework_5.pdf

<http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx>

B5.27 Telecommunications authority	S	Are the appointment procedures for the telecommunications authority respected in practice?	Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess whether the rules regulating the appointment procedures to the telecommunications authority are implemented in practice and whether they effectively guarantee that the members of the media authority are appointed in a	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ Websites of national telecommunications authorities; DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN
		Low risk: The appointment procedures are fully respected			
		Medium risk: The appointment			

procedures are generally respected but are not always effective in safeguarding independence

High risk:
The appointment procedures are not respected

democratic and transparent manner, do not receive any mandate or take any instructions from any person or body, and are effectively independent. Members of the telecommunications authority should avoid exercising functions or holding interests in enterprises or other organisations in the media or related sectors, which might lead to a conflict of interest in connection with membership of the competition authority.

PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/140framework_5.pdf

<http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx>

Interviews with relevant actors.

B5.28 L
Telecommunications authority

Are the procedures for allocation of budgetary resources to the telecommunications authority transparent and objective, i.e. leaving no scope for arbitrary decisions by the governing powers?

YES | NO | Not Applicable |

Arrangements for the funding of the telecommunications authority should be specified in law in accordance with a clearly defined plan, with reference to the estimated cost of its

National laws and regulations.

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

EPRA website: <http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

EU Study: INDIREG: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

No Data

activities, so as to allow the authority to carry out its functions fully and independently. Public authorities should not use their financial decisionmaking power to interfere with the independence of the telecommunications authority.

Websites of national telecommunications authorities;

DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/140framework_5.pdf

<http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx>

B5.29 Telecommunications authority	S	Is the budget adequate and consistent for the telecommunications authority to safeguard its independence and/or protect it from coercive budgetary pressures and to perform its function?	This variable aims to assess whether the budget allocated for the telecommunications authority is adequate to safeguard its independence. Public authorities should not use their financial decision-making power to interfere with the independence of the telecommunications authority.	Websites of national telecommunications authorities Reports by telecommunications authority NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations. National case and European law. Academic writing on the issue. http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ Interviews with relevant actors.
		Low risk: The budget is adequate	Not Applicable No Data	
		Medium risk: The budget is somewhat inadequate but still allows it to perform its function		

High risk:
The budget is not adequate and does not safeguard its independence

B5.30 Telecommunications authority	L	Are the tasks, duties and responsibilities of the telecommunications authority well defined and clearly set out in law?	This variable aims to assess the existence of laws and regulations clearly defining the tasks, duties and responsibilities of the telecommunications authority. These may include regulatory powers and/or the power to grant licences, compliance monitoring, including sanctioning powers.	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ Websites of national telecommunications authorities; DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/140framework_5.pdf http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
B5.31 Telecommunications authority	L	Does the law attribute sanctioning powers to the telecommunications authority?	This indicator aims to assess specifically whether the law attributes sanctioning powers to the authority.	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-

		YES NO Not Applicable No Data	Sanctioning powers may include warning, fine, suspension or revocation of licence, refusal of additional licences, blocking of a merger or acquisition, obligation to allocate windows for third party programming, obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors, and/or divestiture.	legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ National and European case law. Websites of national telecommunications authorities; DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/140framework_5.pdf http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx
B5.32 Telecommunications authority	L	With regard to the telecommunications authority decisions, are there effective appeal mechanisms in place? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess the existence of mechanisms of appeal of the decisions by the telecommunications authority. The appeal mechanisms should be before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/ National and European case law. Websites of national telecommunications authorities; DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN

decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.

PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/140framework_5.pdf

<http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx>

<p>B5.32.1 Telecommunications authority</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Are the appeal mechanisms effective and not systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms indicated above. Appeal mechanisms may be in place but systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies.</p>	<p>Websites of national telecommunications authorities NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations. National case and European law. Academic writing on the issue. http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p>
		<p>Low risk: Appeal mechanisms are effective and not misused</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	
		<p>Medium risk: Appeal mechanisms are partially effective and/or are occasionally delayed</p>		
		<p>High risk: Appeal mechanisms are not effective and/or are systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies</p>		

<p>B5.33</p> <p>Telecommunications authority</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Does decisional practice of the telecommunications authority indicate that the authority effectively uses its powers?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: The telecommunications authority effectively uses its powers</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: The authority's powers are not always used effectively</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: The telecommunications authority does not use its powers in practice</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the practice of the telecommunications authority indicates that it uses its powers in the interest of the public. The answer should be based on a concrete assessment of its decisional practice and other elements, such as whether the telecommunications authority has ever been condemned after an investigation by anti-corruption bodies.</p>	<p>Websites of national telecommunications authorities</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National case and European law.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue.</p> <p>http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx</p> <p>EU Study: INDIREG: http://www.indireg.eu/</p> <p>Interviews with relevant actors.</p>
<p>B5.34</p> <p>Telecommunications authority</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Is there evidence that the Government can arbitrarily overrule decisions by the telecommunications authority?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: The government never overrules decisions by the telecommunications</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the government in your country arbitrarily overrules decisions by the telecommunications authority. Decisions to overrule are considered arbitrary if they are not foreseen</p>	<p>Websites of national telecommunications authorities</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National case and European law.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue.</p>

authority

by law, not reasonable or in bad faith.

<http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx>

Medium risk:

The government at times arbitrarily overrules decisions by the telecommunications authority

EU Study: INDIREG: <http://www.indireg.eu/>

Interviews with relevant actors.

High risk:

The government regularly overrules arbitrarily decisions by the telecommunications authority

Indicator Code O1

Indicator Name Transparency in media ownership

Description This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership and/or control.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
O1.1 Transparency	L	Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to the public? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for transparency towards the citizens, the users and the public in general.	Analysis of laws and regulations.
O1.2 Transparency	L	Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to report ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)? YES NO Not Applicable	The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for accountability and transparency towards public authorities.	Analysis of laws and regulations.

No Data

O1.3 Transparency	L	Is there an obligation by national law to disclose relevant information after every change in ownership structure?	YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This question aims at assessing if the law provides rules on the public availability of accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership. This is a condition for an effective transparency.	Analysis of laws and regulations
O1.4 Transparency	L	Are there any sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations?	YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This question aims at assessing if the law on media ownership transparency can be enforced through the application of sanctions.	Analysis of laws and regulations
O1.5 Transparency	S	Do the obligations ensure that the public knows which legal or natural person effectively owns or controls the media company?	Low risk: all the effective owners are known by the public Not Applicable No Data	This question aim at assessing the effectiveness of the laws that deal with media ownership transparency and if they succeed in disclosing the real owners of the media outlets.	Academic studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating transparency in media ownership. NGOs' studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating transparency in media ownership.
		Medium risk:			

some owners are still unknown

High risk:
the effective owners are hidden

Indicator Code O2

Indicator Name Concentration in media ownership

Description This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the different media. It assesses also the concentration of ownership within the media sector.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
O2.1 Media ownership concentration (AVMS horizontal)	L	Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the audiovisual media sector?	This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the audiovisual media sector.	Analysis of laws and regulations. National laws and regulations (acts, decrees...). Audio-visual media sector: to be interpreted in the light of AVMS Directive. please, reply "yes" if the variable applies to at least linear AVMS. Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist in EU Member States with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of your country and in the light of the thresholds or limits imposed by
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

domestic laws.				
O2.1.1	L	Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the audiovisual sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?	This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.	Analysis of laws and regulations.
Media ownership concentration (AVMS horizontal)		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
O2.1.2	L	Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?	The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: • - Refusal of additional licences; • - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; • - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; • - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors • divestiture.	Analysis of laws and regulations.
Media ownership concentration (AVMS horizontal)		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
O2.1.3	L	Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?	This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high	National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements...), case law, regulatory decisions.
Media				

ownership concentration (AVMS horizontal)

Low risk:
the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases

Not Applicable | No Data

horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the audiovisual media.

Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities.

Medium risk:
the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant cases

Reports by credible agencies (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions) on the enforcement of measures to prevent undue concentration of ownership. Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating national anti-concentration rules.

High risk:
the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers

Academic reports.

O2.2
Media ownership concentration (Radio horizontal)

L

Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the radio sector?

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the radio sector.

Analysis of laws and regulations.

Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist in EU Member States with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of your country and in the light of the thresholds or limits imposed by domestic laws.

O2.2.1
Media

L

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system

Analysis of laws and regulations.

ownership concentration (Radio horizontal)

monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the radio sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?

for the regulation on radio concentration.

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

O2.2.2
Media ownership concentration (Radio horizontal)

L

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: • - Refusal of additional licences; • - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; • - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; • - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors • divestiture.

Analysis of laws and regulations.

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

O2.2.3
Media ownership concentration (Radio horizontal)

L

Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?

This question aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the radio sector.

National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements...), case law, regulatory decisions.

Low risk:
the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases

Not Applicable | No Data

Medium risk:

Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities. Reports by credible agencies (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions) on the enforcement of measures to prevent

the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant cases

High risk:
the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers

undue concentration of ownership. Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating national anti-concentration rules

Academic reports.

<p>O2.3 Media ownership concentration (Newspapers horizontal)</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria, such circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the newspaper sector?</p>	<p>This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the newspaper publishing sector.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations. National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements...). Newspaper definition includes the electronic version of the newspaper. It excludes the website of the newspaper.</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		
<p>O2.3.1 Media ownership concentration</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the newspaper sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on newspaper concentration.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations.</p>

(Newspapers horizontal)

competition authority)?

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

O2.3.2

L

Media ownership concentration (Newspapers horizontal)

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: • - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors • divestiture.

Analysis of laws and regulations. National laws and regulations

O2.3.3

L

Media ownership concentration (Newspapers horizontal)

Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?

Low risk:
the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases

Not Applicable | No Data

Medium risk:
the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant cases

This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of regulatory remedies (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the newspaper market.

National laws and regulations (acts, decrees), case law, regulatory decisions.

Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities.

Reports by credible agencies (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions) on the enforcement of measures to prevent undue concentration of ownership. Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating national anti-concentration rules: Academic

High risk:
the relevant authority never uses
its sanctioning powers

reports.

<p>O2.4 Media ownership concentration (ICP horizontal)</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria, such as distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the internet content providers sector?</p>	<p>This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the sector of internet content providers.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations. National laws and regulations (acts, decrees).</p> <p>Internet content providers: • content originators – which produce original content; • content aggregators – which do not produce their own original content, but present content from a variety of sources as part of a news service (e.g. Google News); and • online intermediaries – which do not produce original content of their own, or aggregate news, but are used as an intermediary between the consumer and the news source (e.g. Facebook, Google search). (source: OFCOM)</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		
<p>O2.4.1 Media ownership concentration (ICP horizontal)</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the internet content providers sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on internet content providers concentration.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		

<p>O2.4.2 Media ownership concentration (ICP horizontal)</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?</p>	<p>The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: • - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; • - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors • divestiture.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations. National laws and regulations</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		
<p>O2.4.3 Media ownership concentration (ICP horizontal)</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of regulatory remedies (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the internet content providers market.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations (acts, decrees), case law, regulatory decisions: Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities. Reports by credible agencies (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions) on the enforcement of measures to prevent undue concentration of ownership. Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating national anti-concentration rules: Academic reports</p>
		<p>Low risk: the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	
		<p>Medium risk: the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant cases</p>		
		<p>High risk: the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers</p>		

<p>O2.5 Media mergers</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Can a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?</p>	<p>This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/ or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector through merging operations. For instance, the law should prevent concentration in merging operations: -By containing media-specific provisions that impose stricter thresholds than in other sectors; -The mandatory intervention of a media authority in merger and acquisition cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority); - The possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the communication authority for reasons of media pluralism (or public interest in general)); -that - even though they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not exclude the media sector from their scope of application.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations. National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements...). Case law, regulatory decisions.</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		

O2.5.1 Media mergers	L	Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with rules on mergers and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?	This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system.	Analysis of laws and regulations. National laws and regulations
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
O2.5.2 Media mergers	L	Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?	Descrizione: The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as: • - - Blocking of a merger or acquisition; • - Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; • - Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors • divestiture.	Analysis of laws and regulations.
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
O2.5.3 Media mergers	L	<p>Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant</p>	This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of regulatory remedies against media mergers, to avoid a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the different media.	National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements...), case law, regulatory decisions. Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities, competition authorities. Reports by credible agencies (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions) on the enforcement of measures to prevent undue concentration of ownership. Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating national

cases

anti-concentration rules: Academic reports.

High risk:
the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers

O2.6 Net neutrality	E	What is the percentage of market shares of the TOP 4 ISPs in your country?	Ownership concentration in Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This indicator aims at assessing the concentration of the ISPs in a country.	Calculation of percentage of market shares of the TOP 4 ISPs within each country.
		Value:		
		Not Applicable No Data		
O2.7 Net neutrality	L	Are there regulatory safeguards regarding net neutrality in your country?	Existence of regulatory safeguards for the impartial transmission of information, without regard to content, destination or source, that aims to safeguard the neutrality of the internet infrastructure.	Analysis of laws and regulations. Case law, regulatory decisions.
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data	Regulatory safeguards: broad sense as laws, regulations or case law, decisions of the authorities.	
			Examples: -regulatory safeguards regarding net neutrality; -policy measures to avoid blocking of certain internet content and/ or	

application providers

-policies to avoid quality discrimination between content and service providers; -regulation on the information of the quality of the services offered by the ISPs; obligation of transparency concerning discriminatory practices in ISP services.

<p>O2.8 Media market concentration (Revenues)</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the market share of the Top4 audiovisual media owners?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the audiovisual media sector.</p>	<p>Please, enter a percentage.</p> <p>Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure.</p> <p>Data: The market share, namely the share of the total revenue in the audiovisual media market, per each owner of the total audiovisual market. Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the market shares of the major 4 owners within the market. Data sources: See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities through the EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-</p>
		<p>Value:</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	

epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe

<p>O2.9</p> <p>Media market concentration (Revenues)</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the market share of the Top4 radio owners?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the radio sector.</p>	<p>Please, enter a percentage.</p> <p>Data: The market share, namely the share of the total revenue in the radio market, per each owner of the total market of radio platform. Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the market shares of the major 4 owners within the market. Data sources: See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities through the EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe</p>
		<p>Value:</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p>		
<p>O2.10</p> <p>Media market concentration (Revenues)</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the market share of the Top4 newspapers owners?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the newspapers sector.</p>	<p>Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure.</p> <p>Data: The market share, namely the share of the total revenue in the newspaper market, per each owner of the total newspaper market. Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the market shares of the major 4 owners within the market. Data sources: See annual reports by national (media,</p>
		<p>Value:</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p>		

communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities through the EPRA website:
http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe

O2.11 Media market concentration (Revenues)	E	What is the market share of the Top4 internet content provider owners?	This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the internet content providers sector.	Please, enter a percentage. Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure. Data: The market share, namely the share of the total revenue in the online content providers market, per each owner of the total content provider market. Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the market shares of the major 4 owners within the market.
		Value: Not Applicable No Data		Internet content providers: • content originators – which produce original content; • content aggregators – which do not produce their own original content, but present content from a variety of sources as part of a news service (e.g. Google News); and • online intermediaries – which do not produce original content of their own, or aggregate news, but are used as an intermediary

between the consumer and the news source (e.g. Facebook, Google search). (source: OFCOM)

<p>O2.12</p> <p>Media Market concentration (Audience and readership)</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the audience concentration for the audiovisual media market in your country?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the concentration of audience across audiovisual media platforms.</p>	<p>Please, enter a percentage.</p> <p>Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure.</p> <p>Data: The audience share per Top4 owners competing in the media market. Share is based on the standard or most accepted audience/readership/subscription measurement system available in the country.</p> <p>Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the audience shares of the major 4 Audiovisual media owners within the audiovisual media market.</p> <p>Data sources: See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities through the EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe</p>
		<p>Value:</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p>		

<p>O2.13</p> <p>Media Market concentration (Audience and readership)</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the audience concentration for the radio market in your country?</p> <hr/> <p>Value:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the concentration of audience across radios.</p>	<p>Please, enter a percentage.</p> <p>Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure.</p> <p>Data: The audience share per Top4 owners competing in the specific media market. Share is based on the standard or most accepted audience measurement system available in the country.</p> <p>Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the audience shares of the major 4 radio owners within the radio market.</p> <p>Data sources: See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities through the EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe</p>
<p>O2.14</p> <p>Media Market concentration (Audience and readership)</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the readership concentration for the newspaper market in your country?</p> <hr/> <p>Value:</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the concentration of readership across the main newspapers in a country.</p>	<p>Please, enter a percentage.</p> <p>Concentration is measured by using the Top4 concentration measure.</p> <p>Data: The readership share per Top4 owners competing in the specific media market. Share is based on the standard or most accepted</p>

Not Applicable | No Data

readership measurement system available in the country.

Measurement: The Top4 are obtained by summing the readership shares of the major 4 newspapers owners within the newspaper market.

Data sources: See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities through the EPRA website:

http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe

Indicator Code	O3
Indicator Name	Concentration of cross-media ownership
Description	This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership between relevant media (audio-visual, press, radio, internet) and cross-ownership concentration in the media market.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
O3.1 Cross-ownership in media	L	Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media?	This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors.	Analysis of laws and regulations. Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist in EU Member States with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of your country and in the
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

				light of the thresholds or limits imposed by domestic laws.
O3.1.1	L	Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media authority)	This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.	Analysis of laws and regulations.
Cross-ownership in media		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
O3.1.2	L	Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?	The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to the regulation	Analysis of laws and regulations. Case law, regulatory decisions.
Cross-ownership in media		YES NO Not Applicable No Data	Examples sanctioning/enforcement powers and remedies: - refusal of additional licences; - blocking of a merger or acquisition; - obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - must carry; - obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors divestiture.	

O3.1.3 Cross-ownership in media	L	Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?	The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation.	Case law, regulatory decisions. Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities, competition authorities. Reports by credible agencies (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions) on the enforcement of measures to prevent undue concentration of ownership. Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating national anti-concentration rules: Academic reports.
		Low risk: the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases	Not Applicable No Data	
		Medium risk: the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant cases		
		High risk: the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers		
O3.2 Cross-ownership in media	L	Can a high degree of cross-ownership between different media be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?	For instance, cross-ownership can be prevented by competition law:	Analysis of laws and regulations, case law, regulatory decisions.
		YES NO Not Applicable	- by the mandatory intervention of a media	

		No Data	<p>authority in M&A cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority);</p> <p>- by the possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the competition authority for reasons of media pluralism (or Public interest in general);</p> <p>Even though the law does not contain media-specific provisions - it does not exclude the media sector from its scope of application</p>	
O3.2.1	L	<p>Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors via merger control/competition rules</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations.</p>
O3.2.2	L	<p>Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of</p> <hr/>	<p>The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to the regulation</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations. Case law, regulatory decisions.</p>

media	<p>non-respect of the thresholds?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>Examples sanctioning/enforcement powers and remedies: - blocking of a merger or acquisition; - obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; -must carry; - obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors divestiture.</p>
<p>O3.2.3</p> <p>Cross-ownership in media</p>	<p>L</p> <p>Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: the relevant authority effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: the authority's powers are not always used in all the relevant cases</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: the relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers</p> <hr/>	<p>The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies of the regulation.</p> <p>Case law, regulatory decisions. Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities, competition authorities. Reports by credible agencies (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions) on the enforcement of measures to prevent undue concentration of ownership. Studies/reports providing overviews of and/or evaluating national anti-</p>

concentration rules:
Academic reports.

<p>O3.3 Cross-ownership in media</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the market share of the major 8 owners (Top8) across the different media sectors?</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership in the different sectors – audiovisual, newspapers, radio, internet and any other relevant media – of the media industry. Concentration is measured by using the Top8 concentration measure.</p>	<p>The market share – that is the share of the total revenues within a market – per Top8 owners competing in the media market.</p>
		<p>Value:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Not Applicable No Data</p>		<p>The Top8 measure is obtained by summing the market shares of the major 8 owners within the different sectors of the media market.</p> <p>Identify which are the Top 8 firms with the highest revenue across all media sectors (AV, Radio, Newspapers and internet content providers) and add up their total revenues (e.g. Firm1 revenue across all media</p>

sectors + Firm 2
revenue across all
media sectors +
Firm 3 revenue
across all media
sectors... up to Firm
8)

Calculate the ratio
between the TOP8
revenues and the
whole revenue
market across
media sectors.

Indicate this
percentage as a
result

Data sources: Such
data can be
obtained from the
European
Audiovisual
Observatory, or
Eurostat.

Indicator Code P1

Indicator Name Political bias in the media

Description This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards that guarantee that in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services all political viewpoints existing in society are represented in a fair (qualitative), balanced (quantitative) and impartial (without taking sides) way. It also aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards that guarantee that in news and informative programmes on private television, political viewpoints are represented in a fair and accurate way. Moreover, the indicator aims to assess the existence and implementation of regulatory safeguards for fair access to airtime on PSM channels during electoral campaigns.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
P1.1 PSM bias A	L	Does media law (including conventions between PSM and the government) impose rules aiming at fair, balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards that guarantee that in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services all political viewpoints existing in society are represented in a fair (qualitative), balanced (quantitative) and impartial (without taking sides) way.	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and

		Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/		
P1.1.1 PSM bias A	L	<p>Is there an administrative or judicial body tasked to actively monitor compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable aims to assess the existence of an administrative or judicial body tasked with monitoring the rules aiming at fair, balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services, and/or hearing complaints about the relevant rules.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p>
P1.1.2 PSM bias A	L	<p>Does the law grant the administrative/judicial body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies in case of noncompliance with the rules?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the law attributes sanctioning and or enforcement powers to the body responsible for monitoring the rules aiming at fair, balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition</p>

			PSM channels and services	authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/
P1.1.3 PSM bias A	L	With regard to the decisions by the authority, are there appeal mechanisms in place? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess the existence of mechanisms of appeal of the decisions by the authority. The appeal mechanisms should be before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU	National laws and regulations. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/
P1.1.4 PSM bias A	L	Are these appeal mechanisms effectively implemented in practice?	This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms indicated above. Appeal mechanisms may be	Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs

		<p>Low risk: Appeal mechanisms are effective and not misused</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: Appeal mechanisms are partially effective and/or are occasionally delayed</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: Appeal mechanisms are not effective and/or are systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>in place but systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies. If there are no appeal mechanisms in place please tick not applicable and indicate this in the comment box.</p>	
P1.2	S	<p>Are regulatory safeguards fair, balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services implemented in practice?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: The regulatory safeguards are fully implemented</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: The regulatory safeguards are only partially implemented</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the effective implementation of regulatory safeguards that guarantee that in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services all political viewpoints existing in society are represented in a fair (qualitative), balanced (quantitative) and impartial (without taking sides) way.</p>	<p>Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs</p>
PSM bias A					

High risk:
The regulatory safeguards are not effectively implemented and/or there is systematic noncompliance

P1.3 PSM Bias B	L	Is there an internal charter of PSM or other self regulatory instrument that guarantees access to PSM channels for political actors?	In some countries the rules aiming at fair, balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services may be governed by self-regulatory instruments. This variable aims to assess the existence of and internal charter of PSM or other self-regulatory instruments guaranteeing access to PSM channels to political actors.	National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
P1.4 PSM Bias B	S	Are these self-regulatory mechanisms effectively implemented in practice?	This variable aims to assess whether the self regulatory instruments that guarantee access to PSM channels for political actors are effectively implemented and guarantee fair, balanced and	Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs
		Low risk: The self-regulatory instruments are fully	Not Applicable No Data	

implemented

Medium risk:
The self-regulatory instruments are partially implemented

High risk:
The self-regulatory instruments are not effectively implemented and/or there is systematic noncompliance

impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services

P1.5 Commercial media bias	S	Is there evidence to suggest that audiovisual reporting on commercial channels offers balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative programmes?	Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess the ways in which various political and ideological viewpoints and interests are represented in the commercial, privately owned audiovisual media, as well as the existence of dominant one-sided (negative or positive) media portrayal of specific political actors.	Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs Reports of ethics councils, press councils, press complaints commissions, media ombudsman, readers' editors etc. Academic research on political bias in media
		Low risk: Political coverage on commercial channels is fair, balanced and impartial.		Commercial radio and television channels are sometimes not captured by formal regulation, and are therefore allowed to follow an editorial line which might show specific political preferences.	
		Medium risk: Political coverage on commercial channels is not always fair, balanced and impartial.			

High risk:
Political coverage on commercial channels is not fair, balanced and impartial; there is clear political bias visible in this coverage.

Fairness and accuracy, however, are mentioned in codes of ethics worldwide as basic journalistic principles which should be respected when covering any (also opposing) political viewpoints.

Please elaborate in the comment box why political coverage is judged as at 'low', 'medium', or 'high' risk, with a reference to any relevant regulation (e.g. law obliging private media to be fair and objective) or self-regulation (e.g. codes of ethics) frameworks.

The relevant timeframe for the assessment should be two years.

P1.6

L

Electoral campaigns

Does media law (including conventions between PSM and the government) impose rules aiming at guaranteeing access to airtime on PSM channels and services for political actors during election campaigns?

This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards for fair access to airtime on PSM channels during electoral campaigns. It does NOT aim to capture the

National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

YES | NO | Not Applicable |
No Data

political advertising rules and practices.

EPRA website:<http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:<http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):<http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

See also:

Council of Europe (2007) Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns (+ Explanatory Memorandum CM(2007)155 add)

<p>P1.6.1 Electoral campaigns</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Do the measures apply to all types of political elections, including presidential, legislative, regional and local elections and referenda?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the rules aimed at guaranteeing access to airtime on PSM channels and services for political actors during election campaigns apply to all types of political elections, including presidential, legislative, regional and local elections</p>	<p>National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		

			and referenda	authorities;
				Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and
				Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/
				See also:
				Council of Europe (2007) Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns (+ Explanatory Memorandum CM(2007)155 add)
P1.6.2	L	Is there an administrative or judicial body tasked to actively monitor compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints?	This variable aims to assess the existence of an administrative or judicial body tasked with monitoring the rules aiming at guaranteeing access to airtime on PSM channels and services for political actors during election campaigns, and/or hearing complaints about the relevant rules.	National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.
Electoral campaigns		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:
				EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation
				Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;
				Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

P1.6.3 Electoral campaigns	L	Does the law grant the administrative/judicial body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies in case of noncompliance with the rules?	This indicator aims to assess whether the law attributes sanctioning and or enforcement powers to the body responsible for monitoring the rules aiming at guaranteeing access to airtime on PSM channels and services for political actors during election campaigns	<p>National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p>
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
P1.6.4 Electoral campaigns	L	With regard to the decisions by the authority, are there appeal mechanisms in place?	This variable aims to assess the existence of mechanisms of appeal of the decisions by the authority. The appeal mechanisms should be before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to	<p>National laws and regulations, including co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-</p>
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU

legislation

Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

<p>P1.6.5 Electoral campaigns</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Are these appeal mechanisms effectively implemented in practice?</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms indicated above. Appeal mechanisms may be in place but systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies. If there are no appeal mechanisms in place please tick not applicable and indicate this in the comment box.</p>	<p>Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs</p>
		<p>Low risk: appeal mechanisms are effective and not misused</p>			
		<p>Medium risk: Appeal mechanisms are partially effective and/or are occasionally delayed</p>			
		<p>High risk: appeal mechanisms are not effective and/or are systematically misused to delay the enforcement of</p>			

		remedies			
P1.7	S	Are regulatory safeguards for access to airtime on PSM channels and services for political actors during election campaigns implemented in practice?		This variable aims to assess the effective implementation of regulatory safeguards for fair access to airtime on PSM channels during electoral campaigns.	Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs Reports of ethics councils, press councils, press complaints commissions, media ombudsman, readers' editors etc. See also: Council of Europe (2007) Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns (+ Explanatory Memorandum CM(2007)155 add). Studies/reports: Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence Election monitoring reports by OSCE Election Monitoring Mission, available through: http://www.osce.org/
		Low risk: The regulatory safeguards are fully implemented	Not Applicable No Data		
		Medium risk: The regulatory safeguards are only partially implemented			
		High risk: The regulatory safeguards are not effectively implemented and/or there is systematic noncompliance			
P1.8	S	Is there evidence to suggest that audiovisual coverage of the electoral campaign on PSM offers proportional and non-biased representation of the		This variable aims to assess the proportions of representation of various political and ideological	Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs National Regulatory Agencies monitoring and various

		different groups of political actors?	viewpoints and interests in the audiovisual media, as well as the existence of dominant one-sided (negative or positive) media portrayal of specific political actors during the election campaigns.	monitoring reports by NGOs and/or scholars (e.g. academic research on political bias)
		Low risk: Different groups of political actors are represented in a proportional and non-biased way on PSM coverage	Not Applicable No Data	See also: Council of Europe (2007) Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures concerning Media Coverage of Election Campaigns (+ Explanatory Memorandum CM(2007)155 add).
		Medium risk: The representation of different political actors on PSM coverage is not always proportional		Studies/reports: Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence
		High risk: Different groups of political actors are represented in a biased and non-proportional, clearly favoring some political actors over others		Election monitoring reports by OSCE Election Monitoring Mission, available through: http://www.osce.org/
P1.9	L	Does media law or any other statutory measure (e.g. conventions between PSM and the government and legislation on the financing of political parties or on elections) prohibit or impose restrictions to political advertising during election campaigns to allow equal opportunities to all political parties?	This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards that prevent financially stronger political actors from obtaining such a large amount of airtime for political advertising that other political actors, who do not have similar financial resources, are relatively suppressed from those	National laws and regulations, including conventions between PSM and the government and legislation on the financing of political parties or on elections, co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation
Political advertising		YES NO Not Applicable		

No Data

channels. The relevance and impact of political advertising increases significantly during election periods.

Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:<http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):<http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

P1.9.1 L

Political advertising

Is there an administrative or judicial body tasked to actively monitor compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints?

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

This variable aims to assess the existence of an administrative or judicial body tasked with monitoring the rules prohibiting or imposing restrictions to political advertising during election campaigns to allow equal opportunities to all political parties and/or hearing complaints about the relevant rules.

National laws and regulations, including conventions between PSM and the government and legislation on the financing of political parties or on elections, co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

EPRA website:<http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:<http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):<http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

<p>P1.9.2 Political advertising</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Does the law grant the administrative/judicial body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies in case of noncompliance with the rules?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess whether the law attributes sanctioning and or enforcement powers to the body responsible for monitoring the rules prohibiting or imposing restrictions to political advertising during election campaigns to allow equal opportunities to all political parties</p>	<p>National laws and regulations, including conventions between PSM and the government and legislation on the financing of political parties or on elections, co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		
<p>P1.10 Political advertising</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Is the possibility of buying advertising space available to all contending parties, on equal conditions and rates of payment?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards that certain political actors from obtaining such a large amount of airtime for political advertising that other political actors are relatively suppressed from those channels.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations, including conventions between PSM and the government and legislation on the financing of political parties or on elections, co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		

Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

P1.10.1 Political advertising	L	Are regulatory safeguards for equal conditions and rates of payment implemented in practice?	This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of regulatory safeguards that prevent stronger political actors from obtaining such a large amount of airtime for political advertising that other political actors are relatively suppressed from those channels.	Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs
		Low risk: The regulatory safeguards are fully implemented	Not Applicable No Data	
		Medium risk: The regulatory safeguards are only partially implemented		
		High risk: The regulatory safeguards are not effectively implemented and/or there is systematic noncompliance		
P1.10.2	L	Does the regulatory framework ensure that the	This variable aims the existence of regulatory	National laws and regulations, including conventions between PSM and the government and legislation on the

Political advertising

public is aware that the message is a paid political advertisement?

YES | NO | Not Applicable | No Data

safeguards to ensure that the public is aware of paid political advertisements

financing of political parties or on elections, co- and self-regulation (acts, decrees, branch agreements, codes of conduct...), case law, regulatory decisions etc.

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

EPRA website:<http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:<http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):<http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

Indicator Code	P2
Indicator Name	Politicisation of control over media outlets
Description	This indicator assesses the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards against excessive ownership and/or control of media by politicians.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
P2.1 Accessibility of data on media ownership	E	What is the share of TV channels owned by politically affiliated entities? Value: Not Applicable No Data	This variable aims to assess if there is an excessive ownership and/or control of TV channels by politicians in the country. We will calculate the risk based on the percentage you insert according to the following formula: Low risk: The of TV channels having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a specific political affiliation.	Sources: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/ NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations. Academic writing on the issue.

		<p>Medium risk:</p> <p>The TV channels having between 50%-30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a specific political affiliation.</p> <p>High risk:</p> <p>The TV channels having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a specific political affiliation.</p>
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P2.2	E	<p>What is the share of radio channels owned by politically affiliated entities?</p> <hr/> <p>Value:</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable aims to assess if there is an excessive ownership and/or control of radio channels by politicians in the country. We will calculate the risk based on the percentage you insert according to the following formula:</p> <p>Low risk:</p> <p>The of radio channels having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p>
Accessibility of data on media ownership				

specific political affiliation.

Academic writing on the issue.

Medium risk:

The radio channels having between 50%-30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a specific political affiliation.

High risk:

The radio channels having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a specific political affiliation.

<p>P2.3 Accessibility of data on media ownership</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the share of newspapers owned by politically affiliated entities?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess if there is an excessive ownership and/or control of newspapers by politicians in the country. We will calculate the risk based on the percentage you insert according to the following formula:</p>	<p>Sources: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/ NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations. Academic writing on the issue.</p>
		<p>Value:</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>Low risk:</p>
				<p>The newspapers having <30% of audience share is owned (controlled) by</p>

				<p>a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a specific political affiliation.</p> <p>Medium risk:</p> <p>The newspapers having between 50%-30% of audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a specific political affiliation.</p> <p>High risk:</p> <p>The newspapers having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with a specific political affiliation.</p>	
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P2.4	S	How would you assess the transparency and accessibility of data on media ownership?		<p>This variable assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over media and distribution networks. It examines the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners.</p> <p>‘Publicly available’ means that the data is not subject of request for access.</p>	<p>Examination of the largest media owners in terms of audience/readership shares (TV, radio, newspapers).</p> <p>Sample:</p> <p>2 (where available) largest print media</p>
Accessibility of data on media ownership		<p>Low risk: Data on political affiliation of media owners is publicly available and transparent</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>		

Medium risk:

Data on political affiliation of media owners are disclosed based on investigations of journalists and media activists or upon request.

High risk:

Data on political affiliation of media owners are not easily accessible by the public and investigative journalists or activists are not successful in disclosing these data.

2 (where available) largest radio networks

2 (where available) largest TV networks

Sources:

Company registers.

Media registers.

Existing media ownership studies and reports, including:

Transparency International data bases:
<http://www.transparency.org/>

Article 19 databases:
<http://www.article19.org/>

European Audiovisual Observatory,
<http://www.obs.coe.int/>

P2.5 Editorial independence	L	Are there self-regulatory measures that stipulate editorial independence in the media?	Consider "yes" only if the two largest media outlets in each category (TV, radio, newspapers), as in the indicated sample, have a self-regulatory measure in place.	Examination of the largest media owners in terms of audience/readership shares.
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data	‘Self-regulatory measures’ are defined as e.g. journalistic codes, codes of ethics.	Sample:
			If there is both a regulatory and a self-regulatory framework, code 'yes', and make a note in the comment box of the type of formal regulation that exists.	2 (where available) largest newspapers 2 (where available) largest radio channels
				2 (where available) largest TV channels
P2.5.1 Editorial independence	L	Is there a designated control institution and/or a complaint mechanism to check compliance with these measures?	The ‘designated body’ can be administrative, voluntary or self-regulatory.	
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
P2.5.2 Editorial independence	L	Does this control institution or complaint mechanism lead to the imposition of effective and proportionate remedies in case of non-compliance with the measures?		
		Low risk: Not Applicable		

The self-regulatory mechanisms impose effective and proportionate remedies in case of non-compliance with the rules

Medium risk:
The self-regulatory mechanisms occasionally impose effective and proportionate remedies in case of non-compliance with the rules

High risk:
The self-regulatory mechanisms fail to impose effective and proportionate remedies in case of non-compliance with the rules

No Data

Indicator Code	P3
Indicator Name	Politicisation of control over media distribution networks
Description	This indicator assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over media and distribution networks. It examines the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners, the proportion of specific political affiliation of media owners across the media market in terms of audience share. It also assesses the level of discrimination by politically affiliated media distribution networks.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
P3.1 Print media	S	How would you assess the conduct of the leading distribution networks for print media? Low risk: Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated Medium risk: At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions High risk: At least one of the leading distribution	Not Applicable No Data Leading distribution network is defined as a network covering more than 15% of the national market.	Media sample: Two distribution networks (If two networks covering more than 15% of the national market are available in the country. If not, one distribution network is sufficient as sample) Sources: Company registers.

		networks is politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions		<p>Political affiliation means that the network belongs to a party, a partisan group, a party leader or a clearly partisan person.</p> <p>Discriminatory actions include unfavourable pricing and posing barriers to media accessing the distribution channel.</p>	<p>Media registers.</p> <p>Existing media ownership studies and reports, including:</p> <p>Transparency International data bases: http://www.transparency.org/</p> <p>Article 19 databases: http://www.article19.org/</p> <p>European Audiovisual Observatory, http://www.obs.coe.int/</p>
P3.2 Radio	S	How would you assess the conduct of the leading radio distribution networks?	<p>Low risk: Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated</p> <p>Medium risk: At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions</p> <p>High risk:</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <p>This variable assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over radio distribution networks. It addresses the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners, and the level of discrimination by politically affiliated media distribution networks.</p> <p>Leading distribution network is defined as a network covering more than 15% of the national market.</p>	<p>Media sample:</p> <p>Two distribution networks</p> <p>(If two networks covering more than 15% of the national market are available in the country. If not, one distribution network is sufficient as sample)</p> <p>Sources:</p>

At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions

Political affiliation means that the network belongs to a party, a partisan group, a party leader or a clearly partisan person.

Company registers.

Media registers.

Existing media ownership studies and reports, including:

Discriminatory actions include unfavourable pricing and posing barriers to media accessing the distribution channel.

Transparency International data bases:
<http://www.transparency.org/>

Article 19 databases:
<http://www.article19.org/>

European Audiovisual Observatory,
<http://www.obs.coe.int/>

P3.3	S	How would you assess the conduct of the leading TV distribution networks?	This variable assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over TV distribution networks (including satellite and cable TV). It addresses the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners, and the level of discrimination by politically affiliated media distribution networks.	Media sample: Two distribution networks (If two networks covering more than 15% of the national market are available in the country. If not, one distribution network is sufficient as sample)
TV		Low risk: Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated	Not Applicable No Data	
		Medium risk: At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes	Leading distribution network is defined as a network covering more than 15% of the national market.	

occasional discriminatory actions

High risk:

At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions

Political affiliation means that the network belongs to a party, a partisan group, a party leader or a clearly partisan person.

Discriminatory actions include unfavourable pricing and posing barriers to media accessing the distribution channel.

Sources:

Company registers.

Media registers.

Existing media ownership studies and reports, including:

Transparency International data bases:
<http://www.transparency.org/>

Article 19 databases:
<http://www.article19.org/>

European Audiovisual Observatory,
<http://www.obs.coe.int/>

Indicator Code	P4
Indicator Name	State advertising
Description	This indicator assesses the influence of the state on the functioning of the media market, focusing particularly on the risk of discrimination in the distribution of state advertisements. The discrimination can be reflected in favouritism towards political parties or affiliates of political parties in the government, or in penalisation of media criticising the government.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
P4.1 Rules on state advertising	S	<p>How would you assess the rules on distribution of state advertising?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on transparent rules.</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on a set of rules but it is unclear whether they are transparent.</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: There are no rules regarding distribution of state advertising to media outlets or these</p>	<p>This variable assesses the presence and transparency of rules on distribution of state advertising.</p> <p>State advertising should be understood as any advertising paid by governments (national, regional, local) and state-owned institutions and companies.</p>	<p>The rules on distribution of state advertising should concern TV, radio and newspapers.</p>

rules are not transparent.

<p>P4.2</p> <p>State advertising vs. audience shares across media outlets</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Is state advertising distributed to media proportionately to their audience shares?</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable assesses if state advertising is distributed to media outlets proportionately to their audience shares.</p> <p>State advertising should be understood as any advertising paid by governments (national, regional, local) and state-owned institutions and companies.</p>	<p>Media sample:</p> <p>National print:</p> <p>2 quality daily newspapers with largest circulation in a given country.</p> <p>2 quality weekly newspapers with largest circulation in a given country.</p> <p>2 tabloids with largest circulation in a given country.</p> <p>National radio:</p> <p>2 leading private radio channels with largest audience share in a given country</p> <p>1 leading public radio</p>
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channel

National TV:

2 private TV channels
with largest audience
share in a given
country

1 public TV channel
with largest audience
share in a given
country

Internet:

2 Internet portals with
the largest shares of
users in a given
country.

Data should be
relevant to the
calendar year of 2014.

<p>P4.3</p> <p>The importance of state advertising</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall TV advertising market?</p> <hr/> <p>Value:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable assesses the share of state advertising as part of the overall TV advertising market.</p>	<p>Low risk: Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market</p> <p>Medium risk: Share of state advertising is 5-10% of the overall market</p> <p>High risk: Share of state advertising is >10% of the overall market</p>
<p>P4.4</p> <p>The importance of state advertising</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall radio advertising market?</p> <hr/> <p>Value:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable assesses the share of state advertising as part of the overall radio advertising market.</p>	<p>Low risk: Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market</p> <p>Medium risk: Share of state advertising is 5-10% of the overall market</p> <p>High risk: Share of state advertising is >10% of the overall market</p>

market

<p>P4.5</p> <p>The importance of state advertising</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall newspaper advertising market?</p> <hr/> <p>Value:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable assesses the share of state advertising as part of the overall newspaper advertising market.</p>	<p>Low risk: Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market</p> <p>Medium risk: Share of state advertising is 5-10% of the overall market</p> <p>High risk: Share of state advertising is >10% of the overall market</p>
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Indicator Code P5

Indicator Name Independence of PSM governance and funding

Description

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
P5.1 PSM management	L	Does the law (e.g. media law, administrative law, company law, labour law, conventions between PSM and the government) provide fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for management and board functions in PSM?	This variable aims to assess the existence of fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for management and board functions in PSM. These requirements could be met for example by applying merits-based appointment procedures.	<p>Analysis of national laws and regulations, including media law, administrative law, company law, labour law, conventions between PSM and the government.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>See also:</p> <p>Council of Europe (2012). Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on 15 February 2012</p> <p>EBU – European Broadcasting Union: http://www.ebu.ch/en/</p> <p>European Audiovisual Observatory: http://www.obs.coe.int/ National media regulation</p>
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

databases (available on web sites of relevant state bodies)

Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at: <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence>

P5.1.1 PSM management	L	Is there an administrative or judicial body tasked to actively monitor the compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints?	This variable aims to assess the existence of an administrative or judicial body tasked with monitoring the rules providing fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for management and board functions in PSM	<p>Analysis of national laws and regulations, including media law, administrative law, company law, labour law, conventions between PSM and the government.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p> <p>See also:</p> <p>Council of Europe (2012). Recommendation</p>
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

CM/Rec(2012)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on 15 February 2012

EBU – European Broadcasting Union:
<http://www.ebu.ch/en/>

European Audiovisual Observatory:
<http://www.obs.coe.int/> National media regulation databases (available on web sites of relevant state bodies)

Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at:
<http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence>

P5.1.2 PSM management	L	Does the law grant that body effective sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies in case of noncompliance with the rules?	This indicator aims to assess whether the law attributes sanctioning and or enforcement powers to the body responsible for monitoring the rules providing fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures for management and board functions in PSM	Analysis of national laws and regulations, including media law, administrative law, company law, labour law, conventions between PSM and the government. Overviews of national media legislation can be found on: EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities; Merlin database European Audiovisual
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		

		Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and	
		Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/	
P5.1.3 PSM management	L	With regard to the decisions by the authority, are there appeal mechanisms in place? <hr/> YES NO Not Applicable No Data <hr/>	<p>This variable aims to assess the existence of mechanisms of appeal of the decisions by the authority. The appeal mechanisms should be before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.</p> <p>Analysis of national laws and regulations, including media law, administrative law, company law, labour law, conventions between PSM and the government. case law.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:</p> <p>EPRA website:http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p> <p>Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;</p> <p>Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ and</p> <p>Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):http://www.nordicmedia.info/</p>
P5.1.4 PSM management	L	Are these appeal mechanisms effectively implemented in practice? <hr/>	<p>This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms indicated above. Appeal mechanisms may be</p> <p>Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs</p>

		<p>Low risk: appeal mechanisms are effective and not misused</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: Appeal mechanisms are partially effective and/or are occasionally delayed</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: appeal mechanisms are not effective and/or are systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>in place but systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies. If there are no appeal mechanisms in place please tick not applicable and indicate this in the comment box.</p>	
P5.2	S	<p>Do these appointment procedures guarantee the independence of PSM boards and management from government and/or a single political group?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: The appointment procedures provide for the independence of PSM boards and management and effectively guarantee their independence</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: The appointment procedures</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This indicator aims to assess the existence of appointment procedures for management and board functions in PSM, which guarantee independence from government/a single political group. These requirements could be met for example by appointment procedures, which assure the presence of the various political groups within the PSM.</p>	<p>Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs</p>

provide for the independence of PSM boards and management but are not effective in guaranteeing their independence

High risk:
The appointment procedures do not provide for the independence of PSM boards and management

P5.3	S	Are the legal safeguards for appointment and dismissal procedures for management and board functions in PSM implemented in practice?	This variable aims to assess whether the legal safeguards for appointment and dismissal procedures for management and board functions in PSM are implemented in practice, or whether there is evidence of systematic conflicts concerning appointments and dismissals of managers and board members of PSM	Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs
PSM management		<p>Low risk: No conflicts concerning appointments and dismissals of managers and board members of PSM</p> <p>Medium risk: Occasional conflicts concerning appointments and dismissals of managers and board members of PSM</p> <p>High risk: Systematic conflicts</p>	Not Applicable No Data	

		concerning appointments and dismissals of managers and board members of PSM			
P5.4	S	Does the government decide about the wages of the PSM employees?		This indicator aims to assess the level of independence of PSM, by considering the mechanisms of its financing and in particular the wages of PSM employees	Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs
PSM management		Low risk: No, the government does not decide on the wages	Not Applicable No Data		EBU – European Broadcasting Union, http://www.ebu.ch/en/ See in particular documents available at: http://www3.ebu.ch/policies/initiatives/sustainable-psm
		Medium risk: The government exercises pressure/influences the wages of the employees			European Audiovisual Observatory, http://www.obs.coe.int/
		High risk: Yes, the government decides on the wages			National media regulation databases (available on web sites of relevant state bodies). Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence
P5.5	L	Does media law prescribes transparent and objective procedures on determining the amount of money to be granted to PSM?		This variable aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards against the under-funding of PSM	Analysis of national laws and regulations, including media law, administrative law, company law, labour law, conventions between PSM and the government. case law.
PSM funding		YES NO Not Applicable			Overviews of national media legislation can be found on:

No Data

EPRA website:<http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities;

Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory:<http://merlin.obs.coe.int/> and

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries):<http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

P5.6 S
PSM funding

How would you describe the mechanism of providing financing to the PSM by the government?

Low risk:
Level of financing (licence fee or other) depends on the economic indicator set in the law

Not Applicable |
No Data

Medium risk:
Government decides on the level of financing based on thorough analysis with public discussion and taking into account others' views

This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of regulatory safeguards against the under-funding of PSM

Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs

EBU – European Broadcasting Union,
<http://www.ebu.ch/en/> See in particular documents available at:
<http://www3.ebu.ch/policies/initiatives/sustainable-psm>

European Audiovisual Observatory,
<http://www.obs.coe.int/>

National media regulation databases (available on web sites of relevant state bodies).

Open Society Institute (2005) and follow-up reports. Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence, available at:
<http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/television-across-europeregulation-policy-and-independence>

High risk:
Government decides on the level of financing without public discussion

P5.7 PSM funding	S	What is the percentage of direct government financing for the PSM?	This variable aims to assess the level of independence of PSM, by considering the mechanisms of its financing, in particular the proportion of direct government financing to the PSM. The variable asks specifically about the percentage of direct government financing for the PSM, of the entire budget of the PSM.	Decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies, media authorities, the PSM or NGOs
		Value:		
		Not Applicable No Data		

Indicator Code	P6
Indicator Name	Independence of news agencies and news aggregators
Description	This indicator assesses the independence of news agencies and news aggregators.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
P6.1	E	What is the market share of the leading news agency?	This variable assesses the market share of the leading news agency.	The market share is measured as the level of audience.
Market share		Value:		Sample:
		Not Applicable No Data		All news agencies officially registered and running at national and/or local level, privately and publicly (including jointly) owned, managed and financed.
				Low risk: No news agency dominates the market (occupy >30% of the market of news agencies).
				Medium risk: One news agency has <50% >30% share of the market of

				news agencies. High risk: The leading news agency has >50% market share.
P6.2 Political independence	S	How would you evaluate the relationship between the leading news agencies and political groupings?	Not Applicable No Data	<p>This variable assesses the political independence of the largest news agencies in the country.</p> <p>Note added on July 10th for clarification and ensuring comparability across countries:</p> <p>Please score medium or high risk, according to your evaluation, if at least one of the news agencies is owned and/or funded by the state. It may be independent in practice, but the question tries to estimate potential threats and risks, which do exist if the agency is owned and/or funded by the state.</p> <p>Sample: All news agencies with at least 15% audience market share at the national level.</p>
		<p>Low risk: None of the largest news agencies is dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy.</p> <p>Medium risk: At least one of the largest news agencies is dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy.</p> <p>High risk: Most or all of the largest news agencies are dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy.</p>		

Indicator Code

I1

Indicator Name

Access to media of different social and cultural groups, and local communities

Description

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards for access to media by various cultural and social groups, and by local communities. Such safeguards may be found in the legal framework or in statutory or co/self-regulatory measures. Cultural and social groups are broadly defined as groups in society with specific characteristics, which distinguish them from the majority. These characteristics can relate to national, racial or ethnical origin, language, religion or belief, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, and age.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
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I1.1

L

Access to airtime by social and cultural groups

Is access to airtime on PSM channels to different social and cultural groups guaranteed by law or by a functional equivalent to the law?

YES | NO | Not Applicable |
No Data

This variable assesses the existence of regulatory safeguards for access to media by various cultural and social groups.

Analysis of laws, regulations, and policy documents.

Sources:

European Audiovisual Observatory: <http://www.obs.coe.int/>

Overviews of national media legislation can be found on EPRA's website: <http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation>

<p>11.1.1</p> <p>Access to airtime by social and cultural groups</p>	L	<p>Is there a designated body monitoring compliance with the law/ functional equivalent to the law?</p>	<p>This variable assesses if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for access to airtime on PSM channels to different social and cultural groups.</p> <p>The designated body can be judicial, administrative, self-regulatory, or voluntary.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations.</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		
<p>11.1.2</p> <p>Access to airtime by social and cultural groups</p>	L	<p>Does the law grant that body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the law/functional equivalent to the law?</p>	<p>The variable assesses if the law is providing a due system of sanctioning/enforcement powers to the designated body.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations, case law, regulatory decisions.</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		
<p>11.1.3</p> <p>Access to airtime by social and</p>	L	<p>Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?</p>	<p>The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation.</p>	<p>Case law, regulatory decisions. Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities, competition authorities. Reports by credible organisations (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions). Academic literature</p>
		<p>Low risk: Not Applicable </p>		

cultural groups	<p>The designated body effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all relevant cases</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: The designated body does not always use its sanctioning powers in all relevant cases</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: The designated body never uses its sanctioning powers</p>	No Data
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<p>11.1.4</p> <p>Access to airtime by social and cultural groups</p>	<p>L</p> <p>With regard to the decisions of the designated body, are there appeal mechanisms in place?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the existence of mechanisms of appeal of the decisions by the designated body. The appeal mechanisms should be before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>National case law.</p>
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11.1.5	L	Are the appeal mechanisms effective and not systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies?	This variable aims to assess the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms indicated above. Appeal mechanisms may be in place but systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies. If there are no appeal mechanisms in place please tick not applicable and indicate this in the comment box.	<p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant national and international organizations.</p> <p>National and European case law.</p> <p>Academic writing on the issue.</p>
Access to airtime by social and cultural groups		<p>Low risk: Appeal mechanisms are effective and not misused</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: Appeal mechanisms are partially effective and/or are occasionally delayed</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: Appeal mechanisms are not effective and/or are systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies</p>	Not Applicable No Data	
11.1.6	L	Is access to airtime on PSM channels to minorities guaranteed by law?	This variable assesses the existence of regulatory safeguards for access to media by minorities.	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Council of Europe, Minorities:Country-specific monitoring: http://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/country-specific-monitoring</p>
Access to airtime by social and cultural groups		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		

<p>11.2</p> <p>Access to airtime by social and cultural groups</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Is access to airtime on PSM channels for social and cultural groups guaranteed in practice?</p>	<p>This variable assesses the effectiveness of regulatory safeguards for access to media by various cultural and social groups.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs.</p>
		<p>Low risk: Social and cultural groups have adequate access to airtime.</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	
		<p>Medium risk: Social and cultural groups have limited access to airtime.</p>		
		<p>High risk: Social and cultural groups have no access to airtime.</p>		
<p>11.3</p> <p>Access to media of local communities</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Is the PSM obliged to have a minimum proportion of regional or local communities involved in the production and distribution of content?</p>	<p>This variable assesses whether the PSM is obliged to have a minimum proportion of regional or local communities involved in the production and distribution of content either via legislation or a functional equivalent, e.g. a management charter.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations (e.g. acts, decrees, branch agreements), case law and regulatory decisions.</p> <p>Sources:</p> <p>EPRA's list of Media Legislation in Europe:</p> <p>http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		

<p>11.3.1</p> <p>Access to media of local communities</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Is the PSM obliged to keep its own local correspondents?</p>	<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable assesses whether the PSM is obliged (either via legislation or a functional equivalent) to have its own regional correspondents. If not, the PSM can choose or rely on material acquired from news agencies.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs.</p> <p>National laws and regulations (e.g. acts, decrees, branch agreements), case law and regulatory decisions.</p>
<p>Sources:</p> <p>EPRA's list of Media Legislation in Europe:</p> <p>http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe</p>					
<p>11.3.2</p> <p>Access to media of local communities</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Is the PSM obliged to have a balance of journalists from different geographic areas?</p>	<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable assesses whether the PSM is obliged (either via legislation or a functional equivalent, e.g. a management charter, employment rules or code) to have a balance of journalists coming from various geographic groups.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations (e.g. acts, decrees, branch agreements), case law and regulatory decisions.</p> <p>Sources:</p> <p>EPRA's list of Media Legislation in Europe:</p> <p>http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe</p>

11.3.3 Access to media of local communities	L	Is the PSM obliged to have national news available in local languages?	This variable assesses whether the PSM is obliged (either via legislation or a functional equivalent) to make national news available in local languages.	National laws and regulations (e.g. acts, decrees, branch agreements), case law and regulatory decisions.
		YES NO Not Applicable No Data		
		Sources: EPRA's list of Media Legislation in Europe: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe		

11.4 Access to media of local communities	S	Does the PSM broadcast local news programmes regularly?	This variable assesses whether the PSM broadcasts local news programmes regularly.	Sources: Press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs.
		Low risk: The PSM regularly broadcasts local news programmes		
		Not Applicable No Data		
		Medium risk: The PSM sometimes broadcasts local news programmes		
		High risk: The PSM rarely or never broadcasts local news		

programmes

Indicator Code I2

Indicator Name Availability of media platforms for community media

Description This indicator assesses availability of media platforms for community media (including minority media) both from the point of view of regulatory safeguards, of their implementation and by assessing what is happening in practice.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
I2.1 Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media	L	Does the law contain specific provisions granting legal recognition to community media as a distinct group alongside commercial and public media? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable assesses the existence of specific regulatory safeguards for community media. Community media is defined as media that are non-profit and accountable to the community that they seek to serve. They are open to participation by members of the community for the creation of content. As such, they are a distinct group within the media sector alongside commercial and public media. Community media are addressed to specific target groups and social benefit is their	National laws and regulations (e.g. acts, decrees, branch agreements), case law and regulatory decisions. Overviews of national media legislation can be found at: EPRA's list of Media Legislation in Europe: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe Websites of national regulatory and

			primary concern.		competition authorities:
			Community media that focus on ethnic, linguistic or national interests also fall within the category 'minority media' (defined below).		Merlin database European Audiovisual Observatory: http://merlin.obs.coe.int/ Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): http://www.nordicmedia.info/
I2.1.1	L	Does the law guarantee independence of community media?	This variable assesses the legal safeguards for the independence of community media.		National laws and regulations (e.g. acts, decrees, branch agreements), case law and regulatory decisions.
Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media		YES NO Not Applicable No Data			Overviews of national media legislation can be found at: EPRA's list of Media Legislation in Europe: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe Websites of national regulatory and competition authorities: Merlin database European Audiovisual

Observatory: <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/>

Nordicom (for Scandinavian countries): <http://www.nordicmedia.info/>

<p>I2.2</p> <p>Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Does the law contain specific provisions granting access to media platforms to minority media?</p>	<p>This variable assesses the existence of specific regulatory safeguards for minority media.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations (e.g. acts, decrees, branch agreements), case law and regulatory decisions.</p>
<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>			<p>Relevant provisions could regard e.g. reservation of TV or radio frequencies for minority media or guarantees for access by minority media to radio and TV networks (i.e. via must-carry rules).</p>	<p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found at:</p>
			<p>Minority media is defined as media that address specific minority groups distinguished by language, ethnic or national identity. Minority media is closely connected with communities they serve, and represents an alternative to mainstream, transnational or national media. Minority media, although accountable to their community and offering different forms of participation, might also generate an economic or commercial profit.</p>	<p>EPRA's list of Media Legislation in Europe:</p> <p>http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe</p>

<p>I2.2.1</p> <p>Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Is there a designated body monitoring compliance with the law?</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess if the law provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for access to media platforms by minority media.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>The designated body can be judicial or administrative.</p>	
<p>I2.2.2</p> <p>Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Does the law grant that body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the law?</p>	<p>The variable assesses if the law is providing a due system of sanctioning/enforcement powers to the designated body.</p>	<p>Analysis of laws and regulations, case law, regulatory decisions.</p>
		<p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>		
<p>I2.2.3</p> <p>Regulatory and policy safeguards for community</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?</p>	<p>The variable assesses the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation.</p>	<p>Case law, regulatory decisions. Official statements and websites of national communications regulatory authorities, competition authorities. Reports by credible organisations (national and international bodies, NGOs/CSOs, trade unions). Academic literature.</p>
		<p>Low risk: The designated body effectively uses its sanctioning powers in all</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p>		

media

the relevant cases

Medium risk:

The designated body is not always using its sanctioning powers in all the relevant cases

High risk:

The designated body never uses its sanctioning powers

<p>I2.2.4</p> <p>Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>With regard to the decisions of the designated body, are there appeal mechanisms in place?</p> <hr/> <p>YES NO Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable aims to assess the existence of mechanisms of appeal of the decisions by the media authority. The appeal mechanisms should be before a judicial body or before a body that is independent of the parties involved, held to provide written reasons for its decisions and whose decisions are subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.</p>	<p>National laws and regulations.</p> <p>National case law.</p> <p>Overviews of national media legislation can be found on EPRA's website: http://www.epra.org/articles/media-legislation</p>
<p>I2.2.5</p> <p>Regulatory</p>	<p>L</p>	<p>Are the appeal mechanisms effective and not systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies?</p>	<p>This variable assesses the effectiveness of the appeal mechanisms indicated above.</p>	<p>EPRA website: http://www.epra.org/</p> <p>NGO reports and reports by relevant</p>

and policy safeguards for community media

Low risk:
Appeal mechanisms are effective and not misused

Not Applicable | No Data

Appeal mechanisms may be in place but systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies. If there are no appeal mechanisms in place please tick not applicable and indicate this in the comment box.

national and international organizations.

National and European case law.

Academic writing on the issue.

Medium risk:
Appeal mechanisms are partially effective and/or are occasionally delayed

High risk:
Appeal mechanisms are not effective and/or are systematically misused to delay the enforcement of remedies

I2.3 S

Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media

Does the state/regional/local authorities support minority media through subsidies or other policy measures?

This variable assesses the authorities' support for minority media.

Sources:

Public documents, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs.

Low risk:
Authorities support minority media through both policy measures and subsidies.

Not Applicable | No Data

Medium risk:
Authorities support minority media only by limited subsidies or policy measures.

High risk:

		<p>Authorities do not support minority media through subsidies or policy measures.</p>			
<p>I2.4</p> <p>Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>Is the independence of minority media safeguarded in practice?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: Minority media is present in the country and independent.</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: Minority media is present in the country but is not fully independent.</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: Minority media is absent or, if present, not independent.</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable assesses if minority media is present in the country and independent or if there is evidence of systematic political censorship, interference or manipulation of this type of media.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs.</p>
<p>I2.5</p> <p>Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the ratio of TV channels dedicated to minorities to total number of TV channels?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: The number of television channels dedicated to minorities is equal to the size of the minority population or more than proportional (but not more than 50% of all TV channels).</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	<p>This variable assesses the number of channels dedicated to minorities in the country, and their ratio compared to the total amount domestic media channels.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO), National Regulatory Authorities, National Broadcasting Union, World Press Trends (WPT), National Industry Associations,</p>

		<p>Medium risk: The number of television channels dedicated to minorities is less than proportional to the size of the minority population.</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: There is no television channel dedicated to minorities.</p>			Public Bodies.
I2.6	E	<p>What is the ratio of radio channels dedicated to minorities to total number of radio channels?</p> <hr/> <p>Low risk: The number of radio channels dedicated to minorities is equal to the size of the minority population or more than proportional (but not more than 50% of all radio channels).</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: The number of radio channels dedicated to minorities is less than proportional to the size of the minority population</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: There are no radio channel</p>	Not Applicable No Data	<p>This variable assesses the number of channels dedicated to minorities in the country, and their ratio compared to the total amount domestic media channels.</p>	<p>Sources:</p> <p>European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO), National Regulatory Authorities, National Broadcasting Union, World Press Trends (WPT), National Industry Associations, Public Bodies.</p>

dedicated to minorities.

I2.7 Regulatory and policy safeguards for community media	E	What is the ratio of newspapers dedicated to minorities to total number of newspapers?	Not Applicable No Data	This variable assesses the number of newspapers dedicated to minorities in the country, and their ratio compared to the total amount of newspapers.	Sources: European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO), National Regulatory Authorities, National Broadcasting Union, World Press Trends (WPT), National Industry Associations, Public Bodies.
		Low risk: The number of newspapers dedicated to minorities is equal to the size of the minority population or more than proportional (but not more than 50% of all newspapers).			
		Medium risk: The number of newspapers dedicated to minorities is less than proportional to the size of the minority population.			
		High risk: There are no newspapers dedicated to minorities.			

Indicator Code

I3

Indicator Name

Access to media for the physically challenged people

Description This indicator assesses the existence and implementation of policies for the promotion of access to media content and services by physically challenged persons.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
I3.1 Policy for access to media for the physically challenged people	S	How would you evaluate the state policy, if any, on access to media content by the physically challenged people?	This variable assesses the existence and coherence of policies for the promotion of access to media content and services by physically challenged persons.	Analysis of policies and support measures and their implementation.
		<p>Low risk: Well-developed policy. There is already a strong tradition of policymaking in this area. The existing measures are coherent and up-to-date with the latest societal changes.</p>	Not Applicable No Data	
		<p>Medium risk: Underdeveloped policy. The existing policies are only nascent and the measures taken are fragmented.</p>		
		<p>High risk: No policy. There are no steps taken in the development of any policy measures.</p>		
I3.2 Policy for	S	How would you describe the subtitles and sound descriptions available for	This variable assesses the level of access to media of people with hearing impairments.	Media sample: Two private TV

access to media for the physically challenged people

people with hearing impairments watching TV?

Low risk:
Subtitles and sound descriptions are available on a regular basis in different scheduling windows

Not Applicable |
No Data

channels with the largest audience share in the country and all public service television channels.

Medium risk:
Subtitles and sound descriptions are available only on irregular basis or in the least popular scheduling windows (e.g. before 14.00).

High risk:
No subtitles and sound descriptions are available.

Indicator Code

I4

Indicator Name

Centralisation of the media system

Description

This indicator assesses the probability of a threat arising to diversity of a media system perceived as high and growing centralisation of media on a national scale.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
I4.1 Regulatory safeguards for local media	L	Does the media legislation recognise regional or local media as specific categories of media with special mission and obligations? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable assesses the regulatory safeguards for the existence and preservation of regional and local media.	Analysis of laws and regulations. Sources: Annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory agencies several of which are available through EPRA's website at: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe
I4.1.1 Regulatory safeguards for local media	L	Does the law reserve frequencies for regional/local radio or TV? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable assesses the regulatory safeguards for the existence and preservation of regional and local media.	Analysis of laws and regulations. Sources: Annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory agencies several of which are available through EPRA's website at: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe
I4.1.2 Regulatory safeguards for	L	Does media regulation prohibit networking or affiliation arrangements between regional/local media and national	This variable assesses whether the media regulation prohibits networking or affiliation arrangements	Analysis of laws and regulations. Sources:

local media		media?	YES NO Not Applicable No Data	between regional and/or local media and national media. Such networking or affiliation arrangements can jeopardize the local or regional character of media.	Annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory agencies several of which are available through EPRA's website at: http://www.epra.org/news_items/updated-epra-list-on-media-legislation-in-europe	
14.2	S	Is legislation effective in safeguarding regional/local media?	<p>Low risk: The legislation is effective in safeguarding regional/local media.</p> <p>Medium risk: The legislation is not fully effective in safeguarding regional/local media.</p> <p>High risk: The legislation is not effective in safeguarding regional/local media.</p>	Not Applicable No Data	This variable assesses if the legislation is effective in safeguarding regional/local media in the country. For example if the law provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for safeguarding regional/local media, including a designated body (judicial, administrative or voluntary) that carries out the monitoring.	Sources: Case law, decision practice, press reports, reports of independent bodies or NGOs.
14.3	S	Does the state support regional/local media through subsidies or other policy measures?			This variable assesses whether the state support regional/local media through subsidies or other policy measures.	Sources: Public reports and statistics.

local media	<p>Low risk: The state supports regional/local media through both a variety of policy measures and subsidies.</p> <hr/> <p>Medium risk: The state supports regional/local media by a limited number of policy measures or subsidies.</p> <hr/> <p>High risk: The state does not support regional/local media by subsidies or policy measures.</p>	Not Applicable No Data	
14.4 Decentralisation test	<p>E</p> <p>What is the percentage of daily newspapers published regionally?</p> <hr/> <p>Value:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Not Applicable No Data</p>		<p>This variable assesses the probability of a threat arising to the diversity of a media system perceived as high and growing centralisation of a media system on a national scale. A relative strength of regional daily newspapers in a particular media system shows the level of its decentralisation and potential to offer information from diverse sources for local and regional communities.</p> <p>In particular, this variable examines the relation</p> <p>Media sample: Regional daily newspapers published outside the capital (e.g. in regional capitals).</p> <p>Sources: National Newspapers Associations.</p> <p>Also see annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities.</p> <p>Based on the percentage indicated by you,</p>

between sold Circulation of National Dailies (CND) published in the capital and Circulation of Regional Dailies (CRD) published outside the capital.

we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula:

Low: CRD – more than 40% of daily newspapers published locally/regionally
 Medium: CRD - 20%–40% of daily newspapers published locally/regionally
 High: CRD – less than 20% of daily newspapers published locally/regionally

<p>14.5 Decentralisation test</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the percentage of Audience Share of Local and Regional TV (ALTV)?</p>	<p>This variable assesses the probability of a threat arising to the diversity of a media system perceived as high and growing centralisation of a media system on a national scale. In particular, this variable examines the relation between Audience Share of Local and Regional TV (ALTV) and national TV.</p>	<p>Media sample: Local and regional TV stations.</p> <p>Sources: See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities.</p> <p>Based on the percentage indicated by you, we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula:</p> <p>Low: ALTV - more than 15% Medium: ALTV - 5 – 15%</p>
		<p>Value:</p>	<p>Not Applicable No Data</p>	

High: ALTV - less than 5%

14.6 Decentralisation test	E	What is the percentage of Audience Share of Local and Regional Radio (ALR) stations?	This variable assesses the probability of a threat arising to the diversity of a media system perceived as high and growing centralisation of a media system on a national scale. In particular, this variable examines the relation between Audience Share of Local and Regional Radio (ALR) stations and national radio stations.	<p>Media sample: Local and regional radio stations.</p> <p>Sources: See annual reports by national (media, communications or broadcasting) regulatory authorities.</p> <p>Based on the percentage indicated by you, we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula:</p> <p>Low: ALR - more than 30% Medium: ALR - 30 – 10% High: ALR - less than 10%</p>
		Value: Not Applicable No Data		

Indicator Code 15

Indicator Name Universal coverage of the PSM and the Internet

Description This indicator assesses the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of the Public Service Media (PSM) and of the Internet.

ID and Group	Type	Question	Description	Method of Measurement
I5.1 PSM coverage	L	Is the universal coverage of the PSM guaranteed by law or through a charter/agreement/convention between the PSM and public authorities? YES NO Not Applicable No Data	This variable assesses the existence of regulatory safeguards for universal coverage of the PSM.	Analysis of laws and regulations. Sources: National laws and regulations (acts, decrees, branch agreements), case law and regulatory decisions.
I5.2 PSM coverage	S	What percentage of the population is covered by signal of all public TV channels? Value:	This variable assesses the probability of a threat arising to accessibility of PSM content and	Document analysis. Latest data available, preferably not older data than 2013. Based on the percentage indicated by you, we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula: Low: >99% Medium: >98% and <99% High: <98%

Not Applicable | No Data

services. It shows the population coverage of public service television broadcasters.

I5.3 PSM coverage	S	<p>What percentage of the population is covered by signal of all public radio channels?</p> <hr/> <p>Value:</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable assesses the probability of a threat arising to accessibility of PSM content and services and broadband. It shows the population coverage of public service radio broadcasters.</p>	<p>Document analysis. Latest data available, preferably not older data than 2013.</p> <p>Based on the percentage indicated by you, we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula:</p> <p>Low: >99% Medium: >98% and <99% High: <98%</p>
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I5.4 Broadband coverage	E	What percentage of the rural population is covered by broadband?	This variable assesses the absence of or insufficient system of broadband networks in rural areas, preventing people from accessing the internet.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Consult the following report: Broadband Coverage in Europe 2013. Mapping progress towards the coverage objectives of the Digital Agenda at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-4-fast-and-ultra-fast-internet-access 2. Extract data for your country from the attached excel sheet; section Rural, Overall broadband coverage (U6 in the excel sheet):http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=8239 <p>Based on the percentage indicated by you, we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula:</p> <p>Low: Broadband coverage >95% Medium: Broadband coverage >75% <95% High: Broadband coverage <75%</p>
		Value: Not Applicable No Data		

I5.5 Broadband coverage	E	What is the broadband penetration in your country?	This variable assesses broadband penetration in your country defined as subscription rate.	<p>Extract data for your country from the following webpage of Eurostat "Broadband and connectivity – individuals" ("Internet access at home", "Percentage of individuals", year 2013):</p> <p>http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=isoc_bde15b_i&lang=en</p> <p>Based on the percentage indicated by you, we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula:</p> <p>Low: >80% Medium: >80% and <60% High: <60%</p>
		Value: Not Applicable No Data		

<p>I5.6</p> <p>Broadband coverage</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the average broadband speed measured in Mbps in download in your country?</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable assesses the average speed of broadband (download).</p>	<p>Extract data for your country for May 2015 from the following webpage of NetIndex/Ookai:</p> <p>http://www.netindex.com/download/1,7/EU</p> <p>Based on the percentage indicated by you, we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula:</p> <p>Low: >30Mbps</p> <p>Medium: >30Mbps and <20Mbps</p> <p>High: <20Mbps</p>
		<p>Value:</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>		
<p>I5.7</p> <p>Broadband coverage</p>	<p>E</p>	<p>What is the average broadband speed measured in Mbps in upload download in your country?</p> <hr/>	<p>This variable assesses the average speed of broadband (upload).</p>	<p>Extract data for your country for May 2015 from the following webpage of NetIndex/Ookai:</p> <p>http://www.netindex.com/upload/1,7/EU/</p> <p>Based on the percentage indicated by you, we are calculating the level of risk according to the following formula:</p> <p>Low: >15Mbps</p> <p>Medium: >15Mbps and <10Mbps</p> <p>High: <10Mbps</p>
		<p>Value:</p> <p>Not Applicable No Data</p> <hr/>		

Indicator Code	I6
Indicator Name	Media literacy
Description	This indicators assesses the state policy on media literacy.

ID and Group	Question Type	Description	Method of Measurement
I6.1 Media literacy	S How would you evaluate the policy on media literacy in your country?	This variable assesses the policy on media literacy in a given country. Media literacy definition: We are using the definition adopted by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive: “Media literacy’ refers to skills, knowledge and understanding that allow consumers to use media effectively and safely. Media-literate people are able to exercise informed choices, understand the	Sources: Celot P. (2015). Assessing Media Literacy Levels and the European Commission Pilot Initiative. EAVI. http://www.eavi.eu/joomla/images/stories/About_EAVI/assessing.pdf
	Low risk: Well-developed policy. There is already a strong tradition of policymaking in this area. The existing	Not Applicable No Data	

measures are coherent and up-to-date with the latest societal changes.

Medium risk: Underdeveloped policy. The existing policies are only nascent and the measures taken are fragmented.

High risk: No policy. There are no steps taken in the development of any policy measures.

nature of content and services and take advantage of the full range of opportunities offered by new communications technologies. They are better able to protect themselves and their families from harmful or offensive material.”

Source of definition:

Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive). <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32010L0013>

16.2	S	16.2 What is the percentage of weekly Internet users in your	Individuals who are regular internet users (at least once a week)
Media			Definition: Individuals using the internet at least once a week in the last 3 months. Individuals aged 16-74

literacy

country?

Low risk:
76-100%

Not
Applicable |

Medium risk:
70-75%

High risk:
0-69%

No Data

Source: Eurostat - Community survey on ICT usage in Households and by Individuals (2014).

<http://semantic.digital-agenda-data.eu/dataset/digital-agenda-scoreboard-key-indicators>

Basis for risk thresholds: The EU average of weekly internet use was 72% in 2013. The EC target for 2015 is 75%.

I6.3

S

Media literacy

What is the percentage of population that has at least basic digital skills?

Low risk:
76-100%

Not
Applicable |

Medium risk:
51-75%

High risk:
0-50%.

No Data

Definition: To be classified in this group, an individual has to have basic or above basic skills in all the four Digital Competence domains included in the Digital Agenda Scoreboard index: information, communication, content-creation and problem-solving.

Source: European Commission, Digital Agenda Scoreboard. Individuals with basic or above basic digital skills (2014).

<http://semantic.digital-agenda-data.eu/dataset/digital-agenda-scoreboard-key-indicators>

Basis for risk thresholds: The EU average of basic or above basic digital skills was 53% in 2013. Circa 75% had above basic digital skills (this % is taken as a threshold for low risk category).